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Analyzing Tort Law: The Flawed
Promise of Neocontract
Peter A. Bell*
We have put aside the notion that the duty to safeguard life and limb,
when the consequences of negligence may be foreseen, grows out of
contract and nothing else. We have put the source of the obligation
where it ought to be. We have put its source in the law.1
The main plot of the torts drama has shifted remarkably as
we begin the 1990s. In the 1970s, the great monster Contract
was being laid to rest after decades of devastating innocent acci-
dent victims. 2 Contract's conqueror, Tort, the youthful, com-
passionate champion of the infirm, stood shining and tall, her
striking visage a warning to all who would maim America's
people. In the best horror-film tradition, however, there were
indications in the midst of this Tort-triumphant drama that
Contract had not yet drawn its last breath.3
As the century's last decade dawns, we are privy to a new
torts drama. In this sequel, hero Tort has become an uninspir-
ing Deng Xiaoping-like figure. The one-time savior has grown
* Associate Professor of Law, Syracuse University; B.A. 1967 Wesleyan
University; J.D. 1970, Stanford University. I thank Marc Lowitz, for valuable
initial research help, and Karen Townsend, for dogged research assistance to
the very end. My colleague Leslie Bender considerably aided my thinking
about this project. Daniel Polsby and Mary Lyndon provided frank, very help-
ful comments.
1. MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217 N.Y. 382, 390, 111 N.E. 1050, 1053
(1916).
2. See, e.g., G. GILMORE, THE DEATH OF CONTRACT 55-85 (1974). Several
commentators have extended Gilmore's insights to tort cases. Professor Peter
Schuck, for example, interprets death of contract as describing judicial hostil-
ity to using the marketplace as a method to allocate the risk of personal in-
jury. Schuck, The New Jud-ial Ideology of Tort Law, in NEw DIRECTIoNs IN
LIABILrY LAW 4, 6-8 (W. Olson ed. 1988).
3. See, e.g., Salt River Project Agric. Improvement & Power Dist. v.
Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 143 Ariz. 437, 447, 694 P.2d 267, 277 (1983) (finding
limitation of liability clause in sales contract between parties with equal bar-
gaining power enforceable); Radiation Technology, Inc. v. Ware Constr. Co.,
445 So. 2d 329, 332 (Fla. 1983) (holding warranty contract that limited remedy
provision not unconscionable); Mid-America Sprayers, Inc. v. United States
Fire Ins. Co., 8 Kan. App. 2d 451, 460, 660 P.2d 1380, 1387 (1983) (holding allo-
cation of risk in a lease not unconscionable).
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gross, ever-greedy and terribly destructive. Tort waddles slop-
pily down Liability Lane crunching the good neighbors' homes
in its ever-widening path. At last, to save the town, forward
steps a new hero, a revived contract law, in its new, cleancut
and even more powerful form: NEOCONTRACT. Neocontract,
true friend of the consumer, ally of a prosperous America, ar-
rives just in time to save the nation from the orgy of Tort gone
mad.
So, more or less, goes the intellectual drama being played
out center stage in scholarly analyses of tort law these days.4
The major scholarship of the 1980s about tort, other than the
congratulatory5 works of Richard Posner, emphasizes the fail-
ings of the tort system and calls for a return to sanity, or for
the quick implementation of alternative systems to perform the
vital functions of compensation and deterrence.6 In the last
half of the decade, a major new kind of analysis of the proper
role of tort has come to the fore, an analysis catapulted to new
heights of prominence, and perhaps popularity, within the last
year through the writing and peregrinations of Peter Huber.7
4. Certainly a lot else is going on in tort scholarship these days. Particu-
iarly significant are the empirical studies of the workings of the tort system
undertaken by the Rand Corporation's Institute of Civil Justice and other or-
ganizations. See, e.g., S. CARROLL & N. PACE, ASSESSING THE EFFECTS OF TORT
REFORMS (1987); A. CHIN & M. PETERSON, DEEP POCKETS, EMPTY POcKES:
WHO WINS IN COOK COUNTY JURY TRIALS (1985); T. DUNGWORTH, PRODUCT LI-
ABILITY AND THE BuSINESS SECTOR: LITIGATION TRENDS IN FEDERAL COURTS
(1988); D. HENSLER, SUMMARY OF RESEARCH RESULTS ON THE TORT LIABILITY
SYSTEM (1986); D. HENSLER, W. FELSTINER, M. SELvN & P. EBNER, ASBESTOS
IN THE COURTS: THE CHALLENGE OF MASS TOXIC TORTS (1985); J. KAKALiK &
N. PACE, COSTS AND COMPENSATION PAID IN TORT LITIGATION (1986); E. KING
& J. SMITH, ECONOMIC LOSS AND COMPENSATION PAID IN AVIATION ACCIDENTS
(1988); M. PETERSON, S. SARMA & M. SHANLEY, PUNITIvE DAMAGES: EMPIRI-
CAL FINDINGS (1988); see also AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, COMPENSATION AND
LIABILITY FOR PRODUCT AND PROCESS INJURiEs - SPRING 1988 PROGRESS RE-
PORT (Apr. 15, 1988); AMERICAN LAw INSTITUTE, COMPENSATION AND LIABIL-
ITY FOR PRODUCT AND PROCESS INJURIES PROGRESS REPORT (Apr. 13, 1987); T.
WILLGING, TRENDS IN ASBESTOS LITIGATION (1987); Hensler, Resolving Mass
Toxic Torts: Myths and Realities, 1989 U. ILL. L. REV. 89. These studies pro-
vide important information, but they play a supporting role in the debate
about whether, and in what form, modern tort law should exist as a societal
response to the problem of accidental injuries. That is the central drama to
which this Article refers.
5. Congratulatory in the sense that they praise tort law for following the
inexorable economic analysis he glorifies in his writings. See, e.g., R. POSNER
& W. LANDES, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF TORT LAW 312-16 (1987); R. Pos-
NER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 147-200 (3d ed. 1986); R. POSNER, THE ECO-
NOMICS OF JUSTICE 192-203 (1981).
6. See supra note 4; infra notes 30-60.
7. P. HUBER, LIABILITY: THE LEGAL REVOLUTION AND ITS CONSEQUENCES
1178 [Vol. 74:1177
TORT AND NEOCONTRACT
That analysis, termed "neocontract" by Huber s, requires tort
law to determine both its liability and damages rules on the ba-
sis of ex ante agreements: what the parties did agree or would
have agreed if they had bargained about liability and damages
before the accident happened.9
Neocontract is a powerful and appealing analytic tool. It
resonates of Rawlsian justice.10 It promises a calm, cool, and
collected analysis of accidental injury problems that seems to
respect the humanity and decision-making capabilities of indi-
vidual adults. Neocontract seems to encourage cooperative be-
havior, with those most intimately affected by tort decisions
framing the rules for their game. It offers an intellectually rig-
orous method of analysis that can be applied to most personal
injury cases.
It is also dangerously flawed as a comprehensive analytic
tool. It fails to give proper care and respect to the individuals
whom it purports to honor. Like its predecessor as a scholarly
darling - economic analysis of law - it regularly fails to rec-
ognize or to allow the law to recognize the realities of the world
of accidents. Neocontractual analysis recognizes the problems
that permeate tort law today, but fails to see or appreciate the
socially valuable aspects of tort that provide the vitality that
drives tort law into so many parts of American life.
This Article will focus principally on neocontractual analy-
(1988). See Hager, Civil Compensation and Its Discontents: A Response To Hu-
ber, 42 STAN. L. REV. 589, 540 (1990)(discussing hook's celebrity). Huber has
travelled far and wide since publication of this book, engaging in debates and
explaining his theses. Memoranda from the Manhattan Institute discuss his
extensive speaking tours, provide glowing reviews of his writings and even of-
fer for sale audio tapes of Huber's performances on radio talk shows. See, e.g.,
MANHATTAN INSTITUTE FOR POuCY RESEARCH, JUDICIAL STUDIES PROGRAM
UPDATE (Mar.10, 1989) (on file with author). At recent scholarly meetings,
law professors from Yale, Stanford and the University of Houston have spoken
of the sensation created by recent Huber visits. An entire panel at the annual
meeting of the American Political Science Association in Atlanta in Septem-
ber, 1989, was devoted to Huber's book, with the author there to confront his
"critics." Huber has been featured in front-page New York Times' discussions
of risk and public policy. E.g., Passell, The American Sense of PeriL A Stifling
Cost of Modem Life, N.Y. Times, May 8, 1989, at Al col 1. He regularly writes
a column in Forbes magazine. See, e.g., Huber, Elechophobia, FORBES, Sept. 4,
1989, at 313. In short, to a much greater degree than any other writer about
tort-related issues, Huber is a visible public figure.
8. P. HUBER, supra note 7, at 195 ("neocontractual plan").
9. Id.
10. See J. RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971). For a more brief descrip-
tion of Rawlsian theory expressly in contractarian terms, see K. SCHEPPELE,
LEGAL SECRErS: EQUALITY AND EFFIcmNCY IN THE COMMON LAw 64-70 (1988).
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sis and the flaws that should disqualify it from dominance as an
analytical tool in tort. Part I examines the substance, and some
of the dazzle, of neocontractual thought about tort rules. It cat-
egorizes and describes the two principal schools of neocontract
and the important variations therein. That discussion also
highlights the most valuable insights provided by neocontrac-
tual analysis thus far.
Part II describes and examines neocontract's serious flaws.
It first faults neocontract for relying nearly completely on ab-
stract notions of autonomy and for ignoring both relational val-
ues and the life experiences of the persons most directly
affected by personal injury law. A related second section em-
phasizes how neocontract's inattention to reality leads one
school of neocontract to inaccurate imaginings about people,
and leads the other school to a flawed understanding of ex ante
agreements as an expression of what people want. Finally, Part
II explains the failure of neocontractual analysis to attend ade-
quately to the safety-enhancing and justice components of tort,
with its essentially ex post look at accidents.
This Article does not aim to banish neocontractual analysis
from tort. Rather, it aims to assist greater understanding of its
weaknesses and of the real strengths of modern tort law. Many
writers have pointed out that we are the prisoners of our intel-
lectual times." It is no surprise, therefore, that much of the
good tort scholarship of the Reagan-Bush years emphasizes in-
dividual responsibility, free markets, and hostility to bureau-
cratic machinery. Most of those notions happen to coincide
with the interests of the business, medical, and insurance
groups whose hostility to the tort system stems from the pain-
ful financial bites tort takes from them. Those financially and
politically powerful groups have borrowed and advanced ne-
ocontractual ideas not just in legislatures, 12 but also in popular
11. See, e.g., Linzer, Uncontracts: Contex4 Contorts and the Relational Ap-
proach, 1988 ANN. SURVEY AM. LAw 139, 196 (1988). Even arch-neocontractu-
alist Richard Epstein has said that if he had been a judge in the 1930s, his
attitudes toward product liability rules would have been very different than
they are now, as a result of the different place at which the "advanced think-
ing of the times" stood. Session One Discussion of Paper by Richard Epstein,
University of Chicago, 10 CARDozo L. REv. 2227, 2238-39 (1989) [hereinafter
Session One Discussion].
12. For example, the American Tort Reform Association, an umbrella or-
ganization of groups seeking to curtail tort law, reported in the spring of 1989
that 131 favorable (to it) new laws had been enacted in 40 states in the preced-
ing four years. U.S. NEws & WORLD REPORT, May 15, 1989, at 50. The legisla-
tive response to the medical malpractice "crisis" that surged and abated in the
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media advertisements.1 3 The latter suggest that business
groups have found it in their interest to foster development of
an intellectual climate of disdain for the tort system. The na-
tion has suffered enough from acceptance of the intellectual
myths of the Reagan years, such as the "trickle-down effect"
and the "evil empire." The legal system may suffer as well if
current intellectual trends so dominate that they are uncriti-
cally accepted by judges, juries14 or the public at large.' 5
mid-1980s resulted in the most extensive legislative intrusion into the common
law of tort since the workers' compensation laws of the early 20th century.
See, e.g., Bell, Legislative Intrusions into the Common Law of Medical Mal-
practice: Thoughts About the Deterrent Effect of Tort Liability, 35 SYRACUSE
L. REV. 939, 943-44 (1984).
13. See, eg., Insurance Advertising: Need To Protect Constitutional Right
to Conduct Voir Dire, 15 ATLA ADVOCATE 4 (1989); The Insurance Industry:
Do its ads undermine jury impartiality?, A.B.A.J., Nov. 1989, at 46; THE NEW
YORKER, Mar. 26, 1990, at 54-55 (one of many large advertisements run by
American International Group, a large insurance underwriter, under the head-
ing "AIG Issues Forum"). Aetna Life & Casualty ran a series of newspaper
ads in four American cities deploring "lawsuit abuse." The American Tort Re-
form Association was "so impressed" by the success of this ad campaign
(Aetna received favorable comments from more than 7000 people) that it cir-
culated glossy poster-reproductions of each of the ads to its membership, with
an offer to supply any number of the posters that a member requests. "Dear
Member" letter from the American Tort Reform Association (Nov. 1989) (copy
on file with author).
14. The prevalence of advertisements excoriating the tort system, and the
efforts of some politically conservative entities to promote scholarship critical
of the tort system, suggest that the powerful anti-tort forces have expanded
their target audience to include judges and jurors. In the early to mid-1980s,
most efforts to curtail tort awards were focused on legislatures. Despite suc-
cesses there, business groups found no great reduction of recoveries. See
Danzon, The Fffects of Tort Reforms on the Frequency and Severity of Medical
Malpractice Claims, 48 OHIo ST. L.J. 413, 415-17 (1987). Increasingly, through
such organizations as the Manhattan Institute and the American Tort Reform
Association and its state affiliates, wealthy interests have supported scholar-
ship critical of tort. The former organization is a conservative think-tank
funded in large measure by Lewis Lehrman, a conservative businessman and
1986 Republican candidate for governor of New York. It has financed or
helped to finance several symposia at which the dominant tone has been criti-
cal of tort. It has supported and heavily promoted Peter Huber's book (cited
supra note 7). That book does an enviable job of excoriating the tort system in
a form accessible to the mass of readers interested in public policy, but who
would throw up their hands at the sight of a densely footnoted law review arti-
cle such as this. The latter Tort Reform Associations have sponsored and pub-
licized studies critical of tort. For example, the Pennsylvania Task Force on
Product Liability, an organization devoted to reform of that state's product lia-
bility law, financially supported the research of two scholars from the Univer-
sity of Pennslylvania's Wharton School, which not surprisingly revealed that
product liability law was having a terrible multi-billion dollar effect on the
state's business. This scholarship was not revealed in a scholarly journal, but
in a well-publicized press conference held at the state capitol at a time when
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In the course of this challenge to the increasingly accepted
wisdom about the virtues of neocontractual analysis and the
vices of the tort system, this Article takes issue with the con-
clusions of many distinguished tort scholars. I encourage the
reader to examine the challenges put forth herein in the spirit
of exploration. We who look at tort law in America do so with
little knowledge about how it actually works and, more particu-
larly, with little empirical basis for many of our premises.' 6
Too much of the writing I read in the course of preparing this
Article reeks of certitude about the rightness of one approach
or another to the problems posed by accidental injuries.17 Such
certainty of direction seems misplaced in a land as uncharted as
the world of tort.
I. NEOCONTRACT: SUBSTANCE AND CHIC
It is not easy to understand "neocontract." As used in this
Article, neocontract falls into two principal categories: one in
which the rules of tort law are determined by what people
would have agreed they should be; the other in which individ-
ual persons and entities pre-determine their levels of compen-
sation and liability under present tort rules by agreements they
make before accidents occur. I term the former category the
the Pennsylvania legislature was considering several pieces of legislation
aimed at curtailing the common law of products liability in the state. See THE
REFORMER, Oct. 1989, at 2 (magazine of the American Tort Reform
Association).
15. These neocontractual, anti-tort ideas may be accepted uncritically by
many people. Anthropologist Robert Hayden concludes that many of the ideas
advanced by neocontractualists find unexamined acceptance among many
Americans because of powerful cultural hostility to formal demands for com-
pensation involving an individual's own injuries, and because of strong beliefs
in our culture in the sanctity of contract. Hayden, The Cultural Logic of a
Political Crisis: Sense, Hegemony and the Great American Liability Insurance
Famine of 1986, Disputes Processing Research Program Working Paper 9, at
10, 33-37 (Institute for Legal Studies, Mar. 1989).
16. See, e.g., P. REUTER, THE ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF EXPANDED
CORPORATE LiABn=rY: AN EXPLORATORY STUDY 46 (1988); Schwartz, Propos-
als for Products Liability Reforn" A Theoretical Synthesis, 97 YALE L.J. 353,
356-57 (1988)[hereinafter Proposals].
17. Alan Schwartz's 1988 article about tort theory in products liability was
a refreshing exception to that aura of certainty. Schwartz, Proposals, supra
note 16, at 356-57. Although I take issue with many of Professor Schwartz's
ideas, I found the spirit of exploration he maintained through his article much
more conducive to careful thought about the problems with which he dealt




"implied contract" (IC) school of neocontract and the latter the
"actual contract" (AC) school.
These main types of neocontractual analysis have their
roots in similar philosophies of law. Both schools relentlessly
articulate the virtues of ex ante decision-making.'8 That means
they favor having people and entities agree on how injury-caus-
ing interactions between them shall be dealt with before such
events occur. Within each school, there are variations in ap-
proach that affect considerably the attractiveness of their can-
didacy to become the primary approach used in resolving tort
disputes.
The common roots of the two schools of neocontract lie in
classical liberal theories of law based on the high value of indi-
vidual autonomy.' 9 Under such theories, society bases its legal
rules on individual choice. When feasible, legal rules would
permit individuals to order their own lives, which includes
freely arranging relationships with others. Law would respect
individuals by enforcing voluntary agreements and by institut-
ing rules that reflect what individuals would agree to if they
were able to do so. Legal rules based on the foregoing princi-
ples have a powerful claim to be termed "just" because the peo-
ple affected by the rules have consented to them.20
Interestingly, many neocontractual theorists find them-
selves equally, if not more, comfortable with a utilitarian philo-
sophical base. The utilitarian roots have two main strands,
both based on the notion that the individual knows better than
anyone else what is best for him. One strand provides that
legal rules should exist in forms that foster and protect individ-
ual arrangements, because the sum of freely derived individual
arrangements will provide the greatest amount of utility in so-
ciety.2 ' The second strand provides that society should choose
18. See Ackerman, Foreword. Talking and Trading, 85 COLUM. L. REV.
899, 900 (1985)("[The ez ante perspective of the lawyer-economist has revolu-
tionized the study of tort law.").
19. See, eg., J. RAwLs, supra note 10, at 118-50. I refer to "theories" when
others might legitimately describe this philosophical basis for neocontract as
essentially one classical individualist theory, see, e.g., Matsuda, Liberal Juris-
prudence and Abstracted Visions of Human Nature: A Feminist Critique of
Rawls' Theory of Justice, 16 N.M.L. REV. 613, 617 (1986), because there are
many different articulations of the individualist ethic in law. See, e.g., K.
Scheppele, supra note 10, at 57-70; Attanasio, The Principle of Aggregate Au-
tonomy and the Calabresian Approach To Products Liability, 74 VA. L. REV.
677, 677-87 (1988); Schwartz, Proposals, supra note 16, at 357-61.
20. See supra note 19.
21. See, ag., infra note 40 and accompanying text.
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the legal rules that create the greatest utility, not because that
in itself determines what is just, but because those are the rules
that people would choose if they were able to do so.22
These philosophical roots, deeply imbedded in American
social philosophy, explain much of the attraction of neocontrac-
tual critiques of the tort system. Huber's immensely popular
writing - for legal academic writing - reverberates with
themes and phrases that appeal to these individualist notions.
His book, Liability: The Legal Revolution and its Conse-
quences, begins by emphasizing the idea of tort as an omnipres-
ent tax on all our goods and activities, and heads its initial
description of the tort system "From Consent to Coercion."23
His final three chapters trumpet the virtues of a tort system
that solves accident problems by consent or choice and that re-
jects the present "coercion."
These philosophical roots also explain the- relentlessly ex
ante approach that distinguishes neocontractual analysis from
conventional tort analysis. It makes little sense to ask a victim
and claimed injurer what rules they would choose to cover
their situation, after an accident has already happened. Each
would be too obviously affected by that decision for agreement
to be likely. Besides, if the parties could agree on the proper
social arrangements for their problem ex post, tort rules would
not be necessary, as the parties could simply settle their dispute
between themselves on a voluntary basis. Therefore, if we are
to determine legal rules by focusing on the mutual consent of
actual or potential interactors, we need to ask what they agreed
to, or would have agreed to, before the accident happened. Ac-
cording to the neocontractualists, those legal rules would be the
"just" rules because they would emanate from the consent of
individuals or entities facing a common problem of risk. Soci-
ety would not be forcing certain solutions to that common prob-
lem on affected persons. Rather, society's rules would be a
22. See, e.g., Schwartz, Proposals, supra note 16, at 357-58. This strand as-
sumes that people would choose rules maximizing social utility because that
would give them the best chance to enlarge personal utility. Theorists who fo-
cus more closely on the individual frequently modify this apparent symmetry
between libertarian and utilitarian theory by emphasizing the lack of consent
that would occur due to persons who fear they might be among those who
would bear the downside burden of that increase in overall social utility. See,
e.g., J. RAWLS, supra note 10, at 150-61.
23. P. HUBER, supra note 7, at 3-5.
24. Id at 190-232. The final three chapters in the book are titled. "Com-




mere enforcement or reflection of their desires. These legal
rules also would be "just" because they would maximize utility,
as reflected in the aggregation of utility decisions by potential
injurers and victims about what would be best for them in the
event injury occurred.
In short, neocontractual analysis begins from a very appeal-
ing place: the view that persons should be able to plan their
own lives, including those parts of their lives involving the risk
of injury, rather than have others make those plans for them.2
One school of neocontractual analysis says this should happen
directly: potential injurers and victims should be able to make
their own arrangements about what will happen when injury
occurs. The other school recognizes that such arrangements
often will not be made, but says that the same result should be
reached indirectly: when injury occurs, it will be dealt with by
the law in the way the parties would have agreed to if they had
been able to make arrangements beforehand. What these vari-
ations mean for tort theory can be understood by a closer look
at each school.
A. THE ACTUAL CONTRACT SCHOOL
The actual contract (AC) school of neocontractual thought
advances the notion that accidental injuries would be better
handled by a system that relies on private contract. When pos-
sible,26 persons encountering a potentially dangerous product,
service, or activity would enter into a contract with the poten-
tial injurers. That contract would set forth how much, if any-
thing, the potential injurer would have to pay if the product,
service, or activity injured the potential victim. It also would
set forth the conditions precedent to the attachment of an obli-
gation to pay. Thus, liability for injuries would depend not on
rules set by society but on arrangements made by the persons
or entities most directly concerned with a dangerous
transaction.
According to the AC school, this situation would be far
preferable to the current tort system because it would no
longer coerce persous into buying more safety or insurance
25. See, e.g., Hayden, supra note 15, at 36-37; Schwartz, Proposals, supra
note 16, at 357 ("[IThe various moral theories to which Americans adhere re-
spect truly consensual arrangements.").
26. With the growth of medical malpractice and products liability cases as
a percentage of total tort disputes, the area in tort in which such agreements
are possible continues to expand. See Epstein, Causation - In Context- An
Afterword, 63 Cm.-KENT L. Rnv. 653, 675 (1987).
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than they want,27 because it would permit potential injurers to
face stable and manageable insurance situations,2 and because
it would get rid of much of the horrendous expense involved in
settling disputes that arise when one person is injured by an-
other.29 As this short list suggests, the philosophical basis for
the school is as much utilitarian as libertarian. The school like-
wise reflects a strong commitment to the free market as the
most desirable method for determining who gets what in soci-
ety, even when the "who" is a person injured in an accident and
the "what" is compensation from the injurer.
Various AC school theorists differ in their commitment to
libertarian or utilitarian philosophies as well as in their percep-
tions of and commitment to the free market. These differences
lead to a variety of specific proposals concerning the role actual
contracts should play in determining the occurrence of and
compensation levels for accidents. These proposals can be di-
vided into three main groups: (a) "pure" liability contracts;
(b) "modified, cushioned" liability contracts; and (c) "modified,
limited-market" liability contracts.
1. Pure Contract
The pure liability contract proposal would give individuals
and entities free rein to decide ex ante what will happen in the
event one of them is injured by the other in a tort situation.30
Richard Epstein seems most clearly to favor this approach.3'
27. See, e.g., P. HUBER, supra note 7, at 8.
28. See, e.g., id at 133-52; Epstein, Products Liability As An Insurance
Market, 14 J. LEGAL. STUD. 645, 669 (1985) [hereinafter Products Liability].
29. See, e.g., P. HUBER, supra note 7, at 225.
30. A "tort situation" is one in which someone arguably has been injured
by another. It includes, but is not limited to, situations in which current tort
law might impose liability on the injurer. Additional situations should be in-
cluded because it is possible that parties agreeing ex ante might agree to some
payment to the injured person in situations in which tort law clearly would
not require it. Workers' compensation laws arguably exemplify such agree-
ments, albeit on a more collective basis.
31. See Epstein, The Unintended Revolution in Product Liability Law, 10
CARwozo L. REV. 2193, 2202-07 (1989) [hereinafter Unintended Revolution]
(chastising products liability law for abandoning traditional privity require-
ments that allowed manufacturers to determine responsibilities by contract);
Epstein, In Defense of the Contract at Will, 51 U. CmH. L. REV. 947, 953
(1984)(praising freedom of contract - "an aspect of individual liberty, every
bit as much as freedom of speech" - in employment situations); Epstein, Med-
ical Malpractice: The Case for Contract, 1976 AM. B. FouND. REs. J. 87, 149
[hereinafter Medical Malpractice] (criticizing medical malpractice law for fail-
ing to permit physicians and patients to work out tort responsibilities by con-
tract). There may be better examples. I think I get Epstein's general drift. In
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Unfortunately, those who seem philosophically most comforta-
ble with this pure - in the sense that the market should be
permitted to operate however its players wish - system of con-
tracting have not articulated in any detail how it would work.
Rather, the pure system has been offered generally as a point
of departure for criticism of current tort doctrine, particularly
in the areas of medical malpractice and products liability.32 It
remains, nevertheless, the most powerful and substantial model
of the AC school, because it is the one most consistent with the
philosophy of self-determination that underlies the school.
2. Modified, Cushioned Contract
More of the "chic" of the AC school surfaces in the modi-
fied "cushioned" system suggested by Peter Huber's writings3s
As befits the leading tort politician-academic of these times,3
Huber provides more dazzle and flash in his writing than those
of us who wade more sluggishly through footnote-infested
swamps. He "floats like a butterfly and stings like a bee" in his
battle with the tort system, and, like most in battle, seems in-
tent on doing what is necessary to win.3s As a result, he is less
the face of his voluminous writings, however, I find it difficult to keep straight
exactly what he says where. Alan Schwartz seems to share Epstein's affinity
for the market as the ideal place for resolution ex ante of tort issues. He care-
fully challenges assertions that market failure occurs often. See Schwartz,
Proposals, supra note 16, at 355-56, 371-84.
32. See, e.g., Epstein, Unintended Revolution, supra note 31, at 2199-2207
Epstein, Medical Malpractice, supra note 31, at 141-49.
33. I find it difficult to pin down exactly what broad approach Huber
would take to tort situations. In his book, Huber seems to favor abandonment
of tort liability when contract is possible and, in its place, the provision of
some kind of injury insurance by the seller of a product or provider of a ser-
vice. P. HUBER, supra note 7, at 194-97. In other writings, Huber seems to
want not as much, or perhaps more. See, e.g., Session Th7ree: Discussion of Pa-
per By George L, Pries4 Yale University, 10 CARDOzo L. REv. 2329, 2339 (1989)
[hereinafter Session Three Discussion] (stating that "any set of legal presump-
tions the courts want to prescribe on silence is okay with me, provided one has
a real law of disclaimability to bring things back to a market optimum").
34. I accord Huber this title largely because he clearly writes and prosely-
tizes for a public of decision-makers much broader than the academic commu-
nity. See supra note 7. Ironically, he most resembles in this respect William
Prosser, whose ideas most influenced the tort world of the 1960s and early
1970s as much because of his eloquence and dedication to getting those ideas
carried through into law as because of the brilliance of the ideas themselves.
Prosser was chief among the group of "Founders" so roundly condemned in
Huber's book. P. HUBER, supra note 7, at 6-10.
35. See, e.g., Huber, Insurance, Not Lawsuits, for the Accident Prone, Wall
St. J., Sept. 28, 1988, at 24, col. 3. In the final paragraph of that article, Huber
encourages readers to keep in mind the need to use the political process to se-
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consistent in his theory than neocontractual colleagues such as
Epstein. He clearly believes in openly arrived at agreements as
the best way to free society from the undesired coercive effects
of tort.36 Yet, he seems quite willing to give away a substantial
piece of that freedom by allowing the law to require such con-
tracts to provide certain minimal levels of compensation.
The Huberian notion of actual contract seems to be one in
which parties would be free to agree ex ante about part of their
responsibilities in the event of an injury-causing accident. The
parties would have to agree to some minimal level of compensa-
tion for the injured person.37 That minimal level would be en-
forced either by the requirement of a mandatory term in all
contracts relating to tort liability, or by the courts' refusal to
enforce, on unconscionability grounds, any tort-related con-
tracts that did not have such minimum compensation guaran-
tees.38 This position retreats from the notion that people
should be entirely free to determine their fate after accidents,
and thus moves away from a more complete commitment to in-
dividual autonomy. It emphasizes, in turn, the gain for society
as a whole. Huber thereby places himself in the camp of ne-
ocontractual theorists favoring contract because it maximizes
social utility. In short, despite his affection for a world of con-
sensual relations, Huber is not above coercion when he believes
it will improve society's well being.
More openly embracing utilitarian objectives with modified
cushioned liability contract proposals is Jeffrey O'Connell, one
of the early proponents of no-fault automobile plans.39
O'Connell, with his focus on no-fault compensation, seems quite
at home with contractual resolution of tort situations. His af-
finity for such plans derives not from some particular respect
for individual autonomy, but from a recognition that consensual
cure appointment of judges who will cooperate with his views of tort. Id Hu-
ber's regular use in his writing of anecdotes chosen and described to make the
tort system look foolish likewise suggests his concern with winning his point.
See, e.g., P. HUBER, supra note 7, at 4. I do not mean to suggest there is any-
thing wrong with trying to convince others of the rightness of one's ideas. I
admire Mr. Huber's skills as a writer and speaker.
36. See P. HUBER, supra note 7, at 224-27.
37. Huber does not suggest what that minimal level would be. See P. Hu-
BER, supra note 7, at 194, 203. Nevertheless, he clearly does not advocate a
"reembrace" of the free contract jurisprudence of the late 19th century, which
holds such allure for Richard Epstein. I&r at 227.
38. Id. at 194.
39. See generally R. KEETON & J. O'CONNELL, BASIC PROTECTION FOR THE




resolutions will reduce dramatically the massive transaction
costs he has long seen as the major flaw of the tort system.40
O'Connell's plans differ from other AC school approaches by
advocating agreements that pay only actual victims, after an in-
jury has occurred.4' O'Connell has recently proposed an inter-
esting plan in which the provider of the product or service
would make a one-sided pre-accident commitment, to which the
victim could agree after the accident. It would require a pro-
vider to bind himself to offer to pay a person seriously injured
by his good or service her net economic loss within ninety days
after the injury. The victim would then have ninety days to ac-
cept that offer or to file a tort claim.4 Like Huber, O'Connell
wishes to encourage consensual dealings while at the same time
guaranteeing minimum levels of compensation to injured per-
sons. Unlike Huber, O'Connell allows the victim to make deci-
sions about giving up tort rights in return for this "cushion" of
compensation with full awareness of the realities of her situa-
tion.43 This makes it unique among the neocontractual ap-
40. See O'Connell, A "Neo No-Fault" Contract In Lieu of Tort. Preac-
cident Guarantees of Postaccident Settlement Offers, 73 CALIF. L. REV. 898, 899
(1985)[hereinafter Neo No-fault]; O'Connell, An Alternative to Abandoning
Tort Liability: Elective No-Fault Insurance for Many Kinds of Injuries, 60
MINN. L. REv. 501, 503-12 (1976). This Article will not rehash statistics show-
ing that the resolution of tort disputes often consumes very large amounts of
time and money. See, eg., J. KAKALiK & N. PACE, supra note 4, at 66-73, 98-
124. The transaction costs of the tort system as it functions today are quite
substantial. Such high costs are not a necessary component of tort. See, e.g.,
Hensler, supra note 4, at 100-04; Symposium, Conflict of Laws and Complez
Litigation Issues in Mass Tort Litigation, 1989 U. ILL. L. REV. 35.
41. See plans described in Cooter & Sugarman, A Regulated Market in
Unmatured Tort Claims, in NEw DIRECrIoNs IN LIABILITY LAw 174, 183 (W.
Olson ed. 1988).
42. O'Connell, Neo No-Fault, supra note 40, at 906-07.
43. O'Connell thinks this plan will assuage some of the tort system's sub-
stantial problems despite the ex post character of its agreements, because seri-
ously injured persons need quick compensation and thus will be reluctant to
take chances in the lengthy, difficult, and risky tort system. Id at 910-14. He
emphasizes that his system will facilitate consensual arrangements without de-
priving victims of any of the rights they have in the current tort system. Id.
Throughout this Article I refer to tort and tort victims using feminine pro-
nouns and to neocontract and tort injurers using masculine pronouns. I do so
to invite you, the reader, to consider more regularly through this Article the
links between the tort-neocontract debate and the debate between feminine
and masculine views of law. See, e.g., West, Jurisprudence and Gender, 55 U.
CI. L. REv. 1, 59-71 (1988); see also infra notes 99-166 and accompanying text
(emphasizing the need for more inclusive jurisprudence). I also use pronouns
this way to encourage you to think about injury victims as a disadvantaged,
perhaps oppressed, group in much the same way you may have learned to
think about women or minorities.
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proaches in its willingness to allow the victim to make decisions
from the harsh reality after the accident.
3. Modified, Limited-Market Contract
The other modified AC school approach requires a mini-
mum level of compensation for injured persons and limits the
kinds of transactions in which the potential victim can give up
her tort rights. This modified approach, most fully articulated
by Stephen Sugarman and Robert Cooter in separate and joint
writings,44 creates a "market in unmatured tort claims."45 In
that market, potential tort victims would be able to contract
away completely their compensation rights in the event of a
tortiously-caused injury, before any such injury occurred. They
would do this by selling their potential tort claim to their em-
ployers. Such a sale would be enforced by courts only if the
seller were left with adequate insurance against injury.46 Not
surprisingly, Cooter and Sugarman articulate the rationale be-
hind their proposal in utilitarian terms: it would eliminate un-
necessary insurance payments consumers make; it would
eliminate the capriciousness of the payments that come out of
the tort "insurance" system; and it would greatly reduce the
substantial transaction costs associated with the tort system.47
This system's willingness to coerce persons into buying certain
"high-quality" insurance and its refusal to permit persons to
sell their tort rights on an open market demonstrate that these
44. S. SUGARMAN, DOING AWAY WITH PERSONAL INuURY LAW 201-09
(1989); Cooter, Toward A Market in Unmatured Tort Claims, 75 VA. L. REv.
383, 383-411 (1989); Cooter & Sugarman, supra note 41, at 174-85. Jeffrey
O'Connell has put forth a similar idea, O'Connell, Bargaining for Waivers of
Third-Party Tort Claims: An Answer to Products Liability Woes for Employ-
ers and their Employees and Suppliers, 644 INS. L.J. 530, 537 (1976), but it has
been Cooter and Sugarman who have put forth the most detailed recent
proposal.
45. See Cooter, supra note 44.
46. Cooter and Sugarman, like Huber, are not precise as to what would
constitute "adequate" insurance. They deal with that concept somewhat more
fully than Huber, however, describing it as 'igh quality" first-party insur-
ance, including insurance that did not compensate non-pecuniary losses, and
that even omitted a small portion of pecuniary losses. Cooter & Sugarman,
supra note 41, at 178. These theorists permit a potential victim to contract
only with her employer because they believe this would result in more equal
bargaining with potential injurers or their insurers, leading to fairer payments
to the potential victims and greater pressure for safety. It also would reduce
the costs of transacting with potential injurers - a large batch of potential
claims could be sold at once - and the costs of arranging for compensation. Id.
at 177.
47. Id at 175-76.
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AC school theorists have ventured far from the libertarian no-
tion of self-determination.
B. THE IMAGINED CONTRACTS SCHOOL
Unlike its actual contract cousin, the imagined contracts
(IC) school of neocontract does not leave potential injurers and
victims to resolve tort compensation by agreement. Instead, the
IC school theorists try to determine what the parties would
have agreed to concerning compensation if they had been able
to bargain adequately before the accident. From that determi-
nation, the IC theorists deduce what constitute the appropriate
legal rules to govern tort situations. For example, in analyzing
product liability rules, Alan Schwartz asks principally what
sort of contract terms pertaining to compensation for injuries a
buyer and seller of a product would agree to in advance of
product-related injuries. 48 To the extent we can discover those
hypothetical terms, the terms should become the law that gov-
erns compensation for such injuries when they occur.49 In
short, the IC school does not concern itself with people's actual
agreements, but rather concerns itself with the imaginary
world of the agreements they would have made, and governs
the tort world accordingly. Contract still controls, but in a
somewhat ghostly form.
Much of the power of this approach comes from its roots in
the idea that people should be able to make their own choices
about what happens to them in life. Law should not force peo-
ple to accept what they would not otherwise choose, without
good reason.sa Even though the IC school does not concern it-
self with real consent from real people, it considers itself true
to the autonomy ideal, because it develops legal rules from
what real people really would have wanted.5' Admittedly, one
branch of the IC school, which I term the "utilitarian" wing,
derives its notions of what people would consent to primarily
48. Schwartz, Proposals, supra note 16, at 357-71. In fact, this IC approach
commonly dominates analysis in fields of law such as commercial transactions
and intestacy. Nevertheless; its prominence in tort analysis is new in the
1980s, probably because courts and scholars did not previously see tort's aims
as effectuating people's intentions.
49. Id.
50. In general, a reason might be a person's inability to safeguard his in-
terests, either because of his incapacity or because he cannot obtain informa-
tion or exercise free choice. See, eg., Schwartz, Proposals, supra note 16, at
372-76.
51. See, e.g., i&. at 358 (linldng this "hypothetical" consent to autonomy).
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from looking at what would be best for them collectively. The
other branch, which I call the "contractarian wing," looks more
searchingly at the particular individuals involved. Despite the
dangers of determining legal rules from imagined factors, the
IC school, particularly in its contractarian form, is more appeal-
ing than the AC school, which supposedly relies on reality, notimagination. The IC school generally does a better job of en-
suring that people get what they really want in terms of protec-
tion and compensation than does the AC school, which only
purports to give them realistic choice in such matters.5 2
The attraction of the IC school to neocontractualists lies in
its freedom from the shackles of preexisting consensual rela-
tionships. Unlike actual contract, imagined contracts can deter-
mine the outcome of and rules for any tort situation. All an
analyst needs is the capacity to imagine either what the parties
would have agreed about how accidental injuries should be han-
dled, had they been able to agree ex ante, or what general rules
people in society would have agreed on to handle these kinds of
accidental injuries, had they been able to get together to
agree.53 This approach can be used in any area of tort law. So
far, it has been used predominately in the analysis of tort dam-
ages, particularly with respect. to compensation for intangible
injuries.M
With respect to damages, the IC school posits that optimal
compensation (what people would want) is equal to the amount
of insurance an accident victim would purchase voluntarily.55
When this analytic spotlight is turned on the issue of appropri-
ate compensation for intangible injuries,5 the IC school con-
cludes that tort law should not award such damages because
52. The reasons underlying my belief are explained more fully later in
this Article. See infra text accompanying notes 135-54, 185-209.
53. Often the imagined getting-together-to-agree scene postulates that the
people devising the legal rules will be ignorant of their particular situations in
the world they invent. See, e.g., J. RAWLS, supra note 10, at 12; K. SCHEPPELE,
supra note 10, at 64.
54. See, e.g., Danzon, Tort Reform and the Role of Government in Private
Insurance Markets, 13 J. LEG. STuD. 517, 520-21 (1984); Leebron, Final Mo-
ments: Damages for Pain and Suffering Prior to Death, 64 N.Y.U. L. REV. 256,
273 (1989).
55. See, e.g., Danzon, supra note 54.
56. Intangible injuries would include those presently awarded in the tort
system for pain and suffering, emotional distress, loss of consortium, or loss of
enjoyment of life. IC school theorists have not tended to focus on reputation
or privacy damages, which they might treat differently. See, e.g., Ingber, Re-




people do not ordinarily buy insurance against such losses.57 If
people do not want to pay for insurance that would pay them
dollars in the event they suffer an intangible injury, the IC
school argues, tort law should not force them to buy that insur-
ance by including it in the price they pay for goods and services.
If tort law awards damages for intangible injuries, providers of
goods and services will have to buy insurance to pay those
awards, paid for by increasing the price of the good or service.
Of course, the tenets of the IC school can be used to deter-
mine appropriate rules for all of tort, not just damages. This
approach has been used recently to suggest rules for products
liability, implied warranty, and a range of substantive areas
dealing with legal secrets.-s
This discussion suggests that the utilitarian and the con-
tractarian wing of the IC school use different analytic tech-
niques, and that the legal rules each advocates might differ.59
The utilitarian wing seems to imagine rule agreements based
on whatever will maximize social utility. For them, people sit-
ting around, unsituated as to the places they would occupy in
society, would agree to rules that would create the biggest so-
cial pie, thereby increasing the chances that each of them
would be better off once situated in society. They would be bet-
ter off because, on average, everyone would be better off with a
larger social pie.6°
The contractarian wing imagines differently in an impor-
tant way. It too is concerned about what effect legal rules will
have on the size of the social pie. After all, the smaller the so-
cial pie, the more likely it is that any one of us will be worse
off. Nevertheless, the contractarians also recognize that people
generally are limited-issue risk averse. This means that regard-
less of how risk averse or risk preferring they are generally,
people are unwilling to take a chance that anything too bad will
57. See, e.g., Danzon, supra note 54, at 520-21; Schwartz, Proposals, supra
note 16, at 364-67.
58. See K. SCHEPPELE, supra note 10, at 269-98; Schwartz, Proposals,
supra note 16, at 392-98.
59. For example, in outlining her contractarian view, Kim Scheppele sees
its strongest impact as prohibiting certain legal arrangements, such as allowing
individuals with superior information to use that information to the detriment
of someone else who had no way of knowing that harm was about to befall
her. K. SCHEPPELE, supra note 10, at 314. Yet, the utilitarian wing might re-
quire privity in products liability, even though that might encourage further
abuse of information imbalances, because it would make people on average
better off. See, e.g., Epstein, Products Liability, supra note 28, at 660.
60. Schwartz, Proposals, supra note 16, at 392-98.
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happen to them. They will not sign on to a legal rule unless
the persons who will be losers in the face of that rule will not
lose too much.61 Accordingly, some legal rules will be adopted
providing a "floor", a certain level of well-being below which
the loser could not fall. Because uncompensated serious injury
may seem an unacceptable state of affairs to a potential victim,
the contractarian wing might insist on some level of compensa-
tion regardless of the implications for social utility overall. Be-
cause the contractarian wing focuses on the situation of the
persons who would be worst off under an agreed upon rule, it
may provide a perspective inclusive of more reality about peo-
ple's injuries than would the more utilitarian wing of the IC
school.62
In sum, there are substantial differences in approach
within the neocontractualist position. Some of these, as I will
emphasize later, seem to come quite close to confirming the
present workings of the tort system.63 The existence of these
separate schools of neocontract, and of the branches or wings
within each school, must be kept in mind in examining neocon-
tract's value in the analysis of tort law. Many of the flaws, and
insights, in neocontractual analysis discussed in Part II apply
only to some of the wings or branches. Before turning to the
troubles engendered by overreliance on neocontract, I will sa-
lute its major insights.
61. This is essentially the approach embodied in John Rawls' "difference"
principle. Rawls focuses more on disadvantaged classes of persons, rather than
on disadvantaged individuals. See J.RAwiS, supra note 10, at 98; see also K.
SCHEPPELE, supra note 10, at 65 (arguing that if an individual does not know
which position in a society he will hold, it is logical for him to attempt to im-
prove the position of the person the individual least wants to be). In his work
on justice in contract law, Anthony Kronman seems to go even further in a
focus on what the law should permit. He advances the principle of "paretian-
ism," that one person should be permitted to make himself better off at an-
other's expense only if it is to the benefit of both that he be allowed to do it.
Kronman, Contract Law and Distributive Justice, 89 YALE L.J. 472, 486-88
(1980). It is not clear whether Kronman would permit an advantage-taking re-
lationship if most, but not all, people taken advantage of increased their
welfare.
62. See, e.g., K. SCHEPPELE, supra note 10, at 309-12 ("a contractarian
point of view involves asking what social arrangements look like to individu-
als"). In Scheppele's view of the agreeing process, "if we ask which rules peo-
ple would agree to live under if they might be anyone in a particular society,
then this requires, in the relevant thought experiments, that people try to im-
agine what it is like to be in other people's shoes." Id. at 311 (emphasis in
original).
63. See, e.g., id ch. 14 (regarding the development of the law of implied




Neocontractual analysis offers several insights concerning
the tort system. It reminds us of the potential, in several major
areas of tort law, for persons who end up as parties in tort suits
to make arrangements about the possibility of accidental injury
before it occurs.64 It reminds us that tort law has effects on the
potential victims who do not get injured, as well on those who
do, and that we therefore also must consider the system's ef-
fects on their welfare when we fashion legal rules.65 And, it re-
minds us that in its eagerness to protect persons, tort law may
be depriving those persons of their freedom to take certain
chances and to arrange for other kinds of protection.
These reminders, while interesting and perhaps useful,
seem relatively insignificant in comparison with the power of
two observations hammered home by a substantial portion of
the neocontractualist writing. First, neocontractual analysis
makes me realize, more fully than all the statistics I have read,
the extent to which the massive transaction costs involved in
tort litigation are the cancer that threatens to do away with
tort. Second, neocontract uncovers and emphasizes that the
poor are taking a particular beating at the hands of tort law.
Although the latter point has been a sidelight of much neocon-
tractual criticism of tort law,66 it quickly wakes up the reader
who believes one of the strengths of the tort system is the
assistance it provides the disadvantaged. Both these points de-
serve further explanation.
1. The Importance of High Transaction Costs
Neocontractual analysis delivers such a powerful message
about the deleterious effects of transaction costs on the tort sys-
tem because those costs seem to be the seminal force driving
64. See, e.g., Epstein, Medical Malpractice, supra note 31, at 141-49. This
and other neocontractualist writings call attention to the potential significance
of contractual agreements in the medical malpractice and products liability
fields, which make up the bulk of high-cost tort litigation. In figures suggested
by the Rand Institute of Civil Justice study of Cook County jury trials, only
4% of plaintiffs brought products liability claims and less than 2% were mal-
practice claims. A. CHIN & M. PETERSON, supra note 4, at 13.
65. See, e.g., Huber, Safety and the Second Best The Hazards of Public
Risk Management in the Courts, 85 COLuM. L. REv. 227, 288-89 (1985)(arguing
that much of the cost of the DPT vaccine results from liability insurance, and
that the high cost may deter some parents from having a child vaccinated).
66. See, e.g., P. HUBER, supra note 7, at 13-14, 151; S. SUGARMAN, supra
note 44, at 41; Priest, The Current Insurance Crisis and Modern Tort Law, 96
YALE L.J. 1521, 1560 (1987).
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the main neocontractual critiques of tort. The most often ar-
ticulated critique from the IC school is that tort forces people
to buy insurance they do not want, at least not at the price be-
ing offered.6 7 You need not be a law and economics buff to rec-
ognize that consumers do not want to pay a dollar for an
expected return of thirty-nine cents.68 When they buy goods
and services costing more because of the associated liability in-
surance costs, consumers are paying for the protection offered
by the tort system. The payout from the system is quite small
compared to the expense of determining whether a payout
should occur. Therefore, the liability insurance that a con-
sumer must buy6 9 gives her substantially less compensation for
each dollar it costs her than does the first-party insurance she
could buy. First-party insurance looks so attractive largely be-
cause it is much cheaper per unit of protection offered. It is so
much cheaper because its administrative costs are only ten per-
cent of the premium. 0 The remainder is returned in the form
of compensatory benefits to its insured. If tort's costs of decid-
ing liability and paying out compensation were significantly
lower, the gulf between what a party pays for first-party insur-
ance and what she pays, via higher prices, for similar liability
insurance "coverage" would narrow, perhaps considerably. As
that gap narrowed, concerns about forcing potential victims to
pay for liability insurance would dissipate somewhat. Issues
would remain about the lack of freedom to refuse that insur-
ance, although it is by no means clear that such refusals could
not be honored.7 1 The liability insurance still would cost more
in relation to its expected payout than the first-party insurance.
67. See supra text accompanying notes 50-52.
68. These figures are suggested by the Rand Institute of Civil Justice
study of compensation in asbestos-related injury cases, in which researchers
concluded that only 39 cents of every dollar paid out by the defendants actu-
ally reached the injured person. See J. KAKALIK, P. EBENER, W. FELSTINER &
M. SHANLEY, COSTS OF ASBESTOS LrIGATION 36 (1983). The average injured
plaintiff receives 56% of all money paid in a tort suit in net compensation. J.
KAKALIK & N. PACE, supra note 4, at 70.
69. "Must," that is, if one assumes that the consumer cannot refuse tort
coverage in return for some payment that makes the risk worthwhile to her.
According to Huber and other neocontractual scholars, that is exactly how the
tort system works: it refuses to let consumers take their chances, even in re-
turn for receiving a substantial benefit. See P. HUBEI, supra note 7, at 195;
O'Connell, Neo No-Fault, supra note 40, at 906.
70. See, e.g., Priest, supra note 66, at 1560 (reporting 10% as administra-
tive costs for private health insurance, 8% as the costs for Social Security disa-
bility insurance, and 21% as the administrative costs for the workers'
compensation system).
71. See infra text accompanying note 241.
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That difference, however, would be substantially smaller, per-
haps so small that consumers would scarcely notice it. More
likely, they would be satisfied to pay that difference, in the be-
lief that they also are buying some deterrence and justice in ad-
dition to a right to compensation.7 2
This brief treatment suggests that neocontract's criticism of
tort on compensation grounds rests substantially on tort's
transaction costs. The same is true for a significant piece of the
neocontractualists' criticism of tort as a provider of safety.73
For the most part, neocontractual theory does not pay much at-
tention to the deterrent effects of tort. Nevertheless, Stephen
Sugarman, in his recent book advocating the death of tort, re-
gards the system's high transaction costs as the death knell for
any consideration of tort as a valuable force for safety. At the
end of the best direct treatment of tort law's deterrent effects
yet done, Sugarman concludes that, in the face of inconclusive
evidence that tort deters, tort law must be regarded as a net so-
cial cost, because it spends so much in transaction costs to
achieve little, if any, deterrence.74 Others continue to criticize
tort as providing consumers with "excessive insurance" if the
damages assessed against defendants are computed to provide
appropriate safety incentives.75 The excessive insurance argu-
ment necessarily depends on high tort transaction costs for its
clout, as outlined in the preceding paragraph.
Neocontractual analysis thus poses a critical challenge for
those who wish to retain the strengths of the ex post tort ap-
72. See infra text accompanying notes 221-22.
73. It is only a "significant" piece of the neocontractualist criticism of tort
as a deterrent, because that criticism also focuses heavily on the courts' inabil-
ity to do a good job of setting behavioral standards. See, e.g., Schwartz, Propos-
als, supra note 16, at 367-70; Huber, supra note 65, at 305-29. Much of this
criticism focuses on decisions in the products liability area and echoes that of
other commentators who believe that judges and juries sitting in individual
cases should not be making decisions about how products should be designed.
That kind of criticism has little to do with neocontractualist thought, except
that as these critics are claiming that decisions about appropriate product de-
sign can be better made by individual consumers, in a series of individual con-
tracts. With respect to this safety aspect, the neocontractual theorists for the
most part seem to regard governmental regulation as the more appropriate
source for decisions about product adequacy. See, e.g., P. HUBER, supra note 7,
at 46-51; S. SUGARMAN, supra note 44, at 153-65.
74. S. SUGARMAN, supra note 44, at 23-24. Sugarman extrapolates from a
variety of studies estimating the percentage of total litigation and related costs
that actually make it into the injured person's pocket. He concludes that each
injury compensated by a tort judgment would have to deter from one to 14
other such acts of negligence for tort to be deterring effectively. I&. at 24.
75. See, e.g., Schwartz, Proposals, supra note 16, at 370.
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proach: we must substantially reduce transaction costs. If this
cannot be done, the disparity in compensation between the tort
system and a contractual system will continue to be so great
that potential victims will find it difficult to resist the neocon-
tractual argument. The benefits of tort simply will not be
worth the price, not because those benefits are negligible, but
because the transaction costs are so high that the price of the
benefit is too great. It would be a shame if justice became too
expensive.
2. The Regressive Tort Tax
It might be even more of a shame if this expensive package
of tort "benefits" contained little justice. That is the second
major threat posed by the neocontractual insight that the tort
system takes from the poor and gives to the rich, or at least the
richer.7 6 This argument also comes from a contractual focus on
what people get for their money. A contractual look at tort
raises the obvious specter of regressiveness. Poor persons, who
suffer relatively little in the way of lost wages from accidents,
receive less money from liability judgments than do more afflu-
ent claimants. At the same time, the poor pay a higher per-
centage of their resources to finance the tort system than do
the secure. This occurs because some of the price of each prod-
uct or service on the market consists of the cost of liability in-
surance 77 for that good or service. For the most part, prices of
goods or services in our society do not vary depending on the
wealth of the purchaser. As a result, when a poor person buys
a good or service, he pays as much for the liability insurance
that comes with that product as does a wealthier individual.
Nevertheless, he is in fact getting less insurance, because the
payout from that liability insurance will be less, often substan-
tially less, than that made to the more affluent consumer.78
The logical corollary of such regressiveness seems to be that,
were the poor able to contract out of the liability system by ob-
76. See D. HARRIS, M. MACLEAN, H. GENN, S. LLOYD-BOSTOCK, P. FENN,
P. CoRFIELD & V. BmRTTAN, COMPENSATION AND SUPPORT FOR ILLNESS AND IN-
JURY 317 (1984) [hereinafter OXFORD COMPENSATION SURVEY] (finding that ac-
cident victims in lower socioeconomic groups were proportionately more likely
to recover damages than victims in managerial or professional occupations).
77. The term "liability insurance" used here is intended to encompass all
amounts spent by the producers/providers of a product or service to pay for
liability costs or expected liability costs.
78. This point has been cogently made by both Priest and Huber, among
others. P. HUBER, supra note 7 at 13-14; Priest, supra note 66, at 1558-60.
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taining the product or service for a lower price in return for a
binding waiver of their tort rights, they would logically do so. 79
They then could use that money to buy more of what they
want, including more loss insurance than they would receive
from compelled liability insurance.8 0
The regressive effects of tort, however, may not be quite as
severe as neocontractual theorists suggest. Because they con-
sume more goods and services, wealthier persons end up paying
more money overall for such liability insurance. These in-
creased payouts do not buy them more protection than the poor
receive from losses due to accidental injuries, unless those in-
creased purchases subject them to greater risks of harm. In
fact, some of the scanty and apparently conflicting data on tort
claims suggests that wealthier persons experience more tort
problems than poor persons, yet they file tort claims at a lower
rate.8 ' In addition, although low-income plaintiffs receive less
total dollars from the tort system than do the wealthy, they
may receive a higher percentage of their income/total wealth
from tort than do the wealthy.8 2 Overall, this means that the
79. Cf. P. HUBER, supra note 7, at 151.
80. One must be cautious in assuming that the poor would see this matter
in exactly the same fashion as the theorists. For example, when given the op-
portunity not to buy uninsured motorist liability insurance with their automo-
bile insurance policies, 81% of the residents of one of Los Angeles' poorer
areas continued to buy such insurance. Because such insurance pays the in-
sured on the basis of tort principles, poor persons stood to gain less return on
such insurance than did wealthier persons. Schwartz, A Proposal for Tort Re-
form: Reformulating Uninsured Motorist Plans, 48 OmIo ST. L.J. 419, 424
(1987). Moreover, these persons were charged substantially more for their
coverage than were residents of higher income areas. Accordingly, even if the
low limits for what that insurance would pay meant that the poor often would
receive as much payout as the financially secure, they were paying a substan-
tially higher price for that coverage.
81. See Abel, The Real Tort Crisis - Too Few Claims, 48 Omo ST. L.J.
443, 457 (1987). An American Bar Foundation study supports the conclusion
that wealthier persons have more tort problems and a lower rate of claiming.
B. CURRAN, THE LEGAL NEEDS OF THE PUBIC: THE FINAL REPORT OF A NA-
TIONAL SURVEY 127-28, 152, 156-57 (1977). Some sense can be made of this in-
formation if one remembers that wealthier persons are less likely to have a
need for the tort system when they are injured, thanks to a higher rate of
first-party insurance and to better informal support systems. Another more
recent study in Great Britain indicated that women, the young, the old, and
the unemployed all were less likely than average to make tort claims for acci-
dental injuries. OXFORD COMPENSATION SURVEY, supra note 76, at 52. Because
the poor are likely overrepresented in these groups, that study suggests the
poor may claim at a lower rate than wealthier persons. But cf. A. CHIN & M.
PETERSON, supra note 4, at 10-12 (noting that "[p]laintiffs more often came
from groups that are perceived as having fewer resources").
82. In figuring that the poor might receive a higher percentage of their
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poor pay less total dollars for liability insurance than do the
wealthy while receiving less total dollars from it. And although
paying a higher percentage of their income for such insurance,
the poor also receive a higher percentage of their incomes from
it.
Moreover, there is some evidence that households of acci-
dent victims end up significantly poorer than accident-free
households. The Oxford Centre for Socio-Legal Studies' exten-
sive survey of accident victims and their compensation in Eng-
land and Wales revealed that total household income of all the
households in its survey was only three-quarters of the national
average, even after taking into account all sources of income
compensationas There seems no obvious reason why the effect
of accidents on United States households would be radically dif-
ferent.84 Regardless of theory, therefore, the tort system may
be working most often to help the poorer segment of society. a5
Not only does tort often work to help the poor, it rarely
works directly against them, and often costs the wealthy. It is
incomes, I do not mean to take into account the obvious: that because the
medical costs for care of similarly injured poor and wealthy bodies will ap-
proximate each other, the tort payment for medical expenses will be a higher
percentage of the poor person's income/wealth. Leaving medical payments
aside, the tort payment should be a higher percentage for the poor. Payments
for the non-pecuniary injuries suffered by poor persons should come much
closer to those made to wealthy persons than are their respective incomes.
Many studies of tort recoveries show that victims with smaller economic losses
receive a higher percentage of their loss than do persons with larger economic
injuries. See, eg., Hensler, Resolving Mass Toxic Torts: Myths and Realities,
1989 U. ILL. L. REv. 89, 100-01. Because the wealthy will have larger economic
losses than the poor, this suggests, albeit not conclusively, that the poor make
out better in tort relative to their total economic loss.
83. OXFORD COMPENSATION SURvEY, supra note 76, at 286. The study
showed further that when the accident victim was the main household earner,
and when the injury was serious, the household income dipped below half of
the national average. Id. at 324-25.
84. See K. DEVOL, INCOME REPLACEMENT FOR LONG-TERM DISABrTY 32-
33 (1986). This study concludes that workers' compensation benefits replace
86% of lost income in the first year of disability, but declining percentages in
succeeding years, so that only 68% of income is being replaced by the fifth year
of disability. Id at 32. The study does point out that social security and pri-
vate disability payments increase that percentage substantially. Id at 49-51.
Yet the study also admits that it did not take into account any attorneys' fees
incurred by claimants in obtaining their compensation. Id. at ix. A more de-
tailed study of the replacement of the net losses of claimants injured by
others' actions concluded that the combination of tort, workers' compensation,
social insurance, and pensions replaced only 36% of the net losses suffered by
claimants. Johnson & Heller, Compensation for Death From Asbestos, 37 IN-
DUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 529, 532 (1984).
85. See supra note 81.
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important not to lose sight of the direct effects of the tort sys-
tem, just because neocontractual analysis has enlightened us
about its indirect effects. The poor rarely are sued and held lia-
ble in tort. Wealthier persons are much more likely to feel the
direct financial and psychological costs of being a tort
defendant.
I do not mean to say that tort law is not regressive, just
that it probably is not as regressive as neocontractual analysis
would suggest at first blush. Tort law is regressive. So, too, are
almost any required safety measures. When producers and
providers are required to spend money on safety, the goods and
services that most likely will go up in price are the low-cost
ones, those most often purchased by the poor. Low-cost goods
most likely will lack the required safety features. For example,
when the federal government imposed flammability standards
on mattresses, the prices of the lowest quality mattresses rose
relatively the most.sa At least when producers/providers make
expenditures on safety in response to tort law, there is a theo-
retical guarantee that the safety benefits to the consumer will
outweigh the costs.8 7 The same is less clearly true for safety
measures imposed by regulation88
II. THE FLAWS IN NEOCONTRACT
"A single death is a tragedy, a million deaths
is a statistic." 89
- Josef Stalin
86. Linneman, The Effects of Consumer Safety Standards: The 1973 Mat-
tress Flammability Standard, 23 J.L. & ECON. 461, 471-73 (1980).
87. Theoretically, a producer will not spend on safety unless the expected
benefits from such an expenditure in terms of accident cost reduction out-
weigh the overall expenditure costs. If the tort system concludes that it will
cost an actor more to institute a particular safety measure than the measure is
expected to save in reduction of accident costs, the system will not hold the
defendant liable for failure to make that safety expenditure.
88. The scholarly study of the mattress flammability standards referred to
above concludes that there was little impact on safety from their implementa-
tion. Linneman, supra note 86, at 462-71. In the environmental area, the En-
vironmental Protection Agency has long been subject to criticism by industry
because it does not base its decisions to ban (or not permit) the use of certain
substances on a judgment that the expected accident costs of the product out-
weigh its benefits. Although there is considerable debate about the extent to
which EPA protects the environment, the agency's standards for barring new
substances or banning old ones do not purport to weigh carefully the safety
costs and benefits. See, ag., Ferebee v. Chevron Chem. Co., 736 F.2d 1529 (D.C.
Cir.), cert denied, 469 U.S. 1062 (1984).
89. J. BARTLETT, BARTLE'rrs FAmLiAR QUOTATIONs 766 (15th ed. 1980).
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Neocontractual theorists seem to believe their mode of
analysis should reign supreme in the legal resolution of tort sit-
uations. They clearly propose that actual contracts play a domi-
nant role in the resolution of medical malpractice and products
liability cases, which dominate present tort litigation.90 When
actual contract is not feasible, they would determine the rules
in those areas by imagined contracts. In fact, they argue that
neocontract should govern tort even when no preexisting rela-
tionship between victim and injurer allow for actual pre-tort
contracts. Contracting could be done by creating a market for
unmatured tort claims,91 or, more practically, by using rules
fashioned through an examination of what people would agree
to in general.
Neocontractual analysis is deeply flawed, although often
appealing. Some of its appeal is deserved, particularly when
neocontractual analysis illuminates the dark sides of tort. As
an overall prescriptive device 92 for tort rules, however, neocon-
tractual analysis fails. It fails most fully because it seeks to
reimpose on the law of tort a philosophy and style of dispute
90. Medical malpractice and products liability suits make up the largest
group of high award cases. A. CHIN & M. PETERSON, supra note 4, at 52-53.
I refer to neocontractual theorists here as though they were a unified
group even though the preceding section recognizes significant differences
among them. The common philosophical roots of both schools of neocontract
and their similarities in analytic approach make it appropriate to treat them as
one theoretical group in discussing many of the flaws of neocontract. It should
become clear later in this discussion that the differences among neocontractual
theories outlined above do render them differently attractive as solutions to
the problem of accidental injury.
91. See Cooter & Sugarman, supra note 41, at 174-85.
92. I emphasize the flaws of neocontractual analysis because I believe it is
a way, not the way, of looking at tort law. The existence of these flaws should
caution us against accepting conclusions about tort rules or practices that seem
to flow from that analysis. For example, neocontractual analysis seemingly
would lead to the conclusion that tort law should not award damages for non-
pecuniary loss. See, eg., Danzon, supra note 54, at 520-24 (stating that the "op-
timal compensatory award is the amount of insurance the victim would have
purchased voluntarily," and finding the willingness to pay for even first-party
non-pecuniary loss insurance very low). It is certainly valuable for architects
of tort rules to be sensitive to the unwillingness of persons to purchase a right
to money in the event they suffer psychic injury. Such increased sensitivity
might advance the search for a method of compensation/deterrence that does
not commodify human suffering by forcing it into dollar terms. See R. Abel,
Torts, A22 (unpublished manuscript, prepared for Association of American
Law Schools' Annual Meeting, January 4-7, 1990, on file with author). Yet, it
should not lead to a decision to bar recovery for most or all non-pecuniary
damages in tort, in part because of the flaws in the basic analysis. Some of
those flaws related to the validity of recovery for non-economic loss are set
forth in infra text accompanying notes 210-25.
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resolution, which I term "predetermined law," that hobbles
achievement of substantive justice and individual empower-
ment. The abstraction inherent in that philosophy underlies a
second major flaw of neocontractual analysis as advanced by
most present theorists: they fail to see adequately the people
whose agreements supposedly determine how tort situations
will be resolved, and they fail to see adequately many of the
ways in which the relevant world works. Finally, neocontrac-
tual analysis fails because it does not appreciate what may be
lost in the transition from the present tort system, particularly
in terms of deterrence and justice. In discussing these flaws, I
will pay most attention to the central features of neocontract
discussed in Part I: the AC school's emphasis on arranging
many and perhaps most potential tort situations through use of
actual contracts, and the IC school's emphasis on severely limit-
ing tort damages.
A. THE FLAWS OF PREDETERMINED LAW
The analytic utopia for neocontract has people sitting to-
gether calmly, in the "coolness of the beforehand,"93 talking
about the possibility that they, or others in society9 might in-
jure or be injured. From this place come the rules, established
by agreement, that govern tort situations when they arise.
These rules and this method of deciding the outcomes of tort
situations before they arise comprise what I call "predeter-
mined law." I will discuss some of the falseness of that "cool-
ness" image itself in the next subsection. First, I will discuss
why that attractive image should not govern tort decision-
making.
Tort law currently is the very opposite of predetermined
law. Modern tort law is determined by public policy choices,
not by private agreements.95 It is determined in the agitated
93. P. HUBER, supra note 7, at 226. For some reason, the images this
phrase conjures in my mind are always either a group of white men in white-
linen suits, sitting around on a front porch sipping mint juleps; or, a less-
clearly-male group of white English people sitting in a drawing room having
afternoon tea. Fearful of my own ethnocentricity, I invite the reader to try on
your own image. My image of tort lawsuits is not so confined to people of no
color.
94. The AC school would have the parties talking about what to do about
their own possibilities of injuring and being injured. The IC school would
have the people discussing how injury situations, which might involve them,
would be handled in society.
95. Tort does not completely ignore private agreements, even when those
agreements pertain to the existence of tort liability or limitations thereon.
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emotional hotness of the afterward, in the context of actual
controversies in which actual injury victims sue allegedly actual
injurers. For the most part, tort law requires a party who has
acted unreasonably, and thereby caused injury, to pay for those
injuries.9 Even in those appellate decisions articulating tort
"law" of general applicability, the courts focus in part on the
parties before them.
Neocontract, in contrast, espouses a philosophy of dispute
resolution and rule setting that looks at tort situations and the
people therein in an abstract manner. Its characteristic ex ante
method for reaching decisions requires individuals and society
to look at the world of accidental injury as they expect it to be.
The individual is valued in neocontract - Peter Huber's book
seeks to wrest from the coercive tort system the individual's
ability to order his life's affairs; Alan Schwartz builds his prod-
ucts liability rules on the base of consumer sovereignty97 - but
the individual is valued in the abstract and in isolation. Neo-
contract's concern for the individual seems fully satisfied by
giving the individual imagined or real choices about liability
rules ex ante.
These distinctive features of neocontractual analysis must
make us skeptical about its conclusions regarding tort law.
Neocontract is imprisoned by an autonomous world view that
unnecessarily narrows its views of what is relevant to decisions
about what should be done with real-life accidents. No doubt
because of that world view, its predetermined law is built on
the shaky foundation of the imagined, rather than the solid
foundation of real people and real situations. Finally, neocon-
tract's attention to the individual, by placing the center of at-
tention on the person-who-might-be-victim, takes power away
from the individuals who need it most and have traditionally
been the focus of tort: the people in society who actually are
See, e.g., Gross v. Sweet, 49 N.Y.2d 102, 106, 400 N.E.2d 306, 308, 424 N.Y.S.2d
365, 367 (1979); supra note 3.
96. This statement of a general tort principle is overbroad. There remain
pockets of strict liability in tort law, particularly in the area of abnormally
dangerous activities. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § § 519, 520
(1976). If "unreasonably" includes intentional invasions of protected interests,
the statement fairly describes most of the rest of tort law. With the exception
of liability for manufacturing defects, products liability has largely settled
down so that there is no liability unless a product was unreasonably dangerous
when marketed. See, e.g., Note, Products Liability - Negligence Presumed:
An Evolution, 67 TEX. L. REV. 851, 859 & n.46 (1989).
97. For fuller explication of Huber's, Schwartz's and other neocontractu-
alists' plans or philosophies, see text accompanying supra notes 26-63.
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injured in tort situations. Each of these flaws in predetermined
law merits separate attention.
1. The Prison of Autonomy and Abstraction
Neocontractual analysis of tort emanates from neocon-
tract's philosophical devotion to the principle of autonomy.98
That is both its strength and its limitation. Neocontract's
strength lies in the notion that people should be able to deter-
mine what happens to them, in tort situations as well as else-
where. It makes self determination happen through use of
actual or imagined agreements, which supposedly allow individ-
uals to choose how tort will treat them. Unfortunately, provid-
ing such freedom for ex ante arrangements expresses only one
side of what we value in society, and requires us to think in
only one narrow way about the principles governing tort situa-
tions. Neocontract emphasizes individualism and procedural
justice. It ignores relationships and substantive justice.
In its focus on autonomy, neocontract misses the value of
connection. Communitarian and feminist legal theory have
highlighted recently the importance of looking at more rela-
tional views of law, views that emphasize reciprocity and soli-
darity and an "ethic of care."'' Just as persons in society have
concerns about being overcome or invaded by others, so too do
we have concerns about being isolated or separated from
others. Most of us can readilylee identify both of those con-
cerns as significant parts of our psychological makeup and can
readily identify places in our lives where each of those concerns
dominantly motivated our behavior. Yet, neocontractual analy-
sis heeds only one of those two major forces in our lives: auton-
98. See supra notes 19-22 and accompanying text.
99. There are too many articulations of general principles of feminist ju-
risprudence for the neocontractualists to have ignored them (as they largely
do, save Professor Scheppele). The best articulation of feminist jurisprudence
directly related to tort comes in the work of Leslie Bender. See Bender, A
Lawyer's Primer on Feminist Theory and Tort, 38 J. LEGAL EDUC. 3 (1988).
For a general view, see Feminist Discourse, Moral Values and the Law - A
Conversation, 34 BUFFALO L. REV. 11 (1985); Scales, The Emergence of Femi-
nist Jurisprudence- An Essay, 95 YALE L.J. 1373 (1986). For a recent snapshot,
somewhat critical, of communitarian jurisprudence, see Gutmann, Communi-
tarian Critics of Liberalism, 14 PHM. & PUB. AFF. 308 (1985).
100. Critical legal theorists, in particular, have stressed the contradiction
between people's desire for autonomy and fear of the other, and their desire
for connection and fear of alienation. They see that contradiction as a central
feature of our lives, which is reflected in the conflict between liberal theory
and critical theory. West, supra note 43, at 50-54.
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omy and individuation. Embracing this separation thesis,101
neocontract sees a world primarily consisting of individuals, out
to protect and maximize their individual positions.
This philosophical one-sidedness shows up in many places
in neocontract. Most obviously, it shows up in the AC school,
which wants to resolve tort situations through actual agree-
ments between potential victims and potential injurers. That
school seeks to bring persons together so that the potential vic-
tims will give up their full tort rights in return for some bene-
fit,1 ° 2 presumably a price reduction for the good or service,
some cash payment, or some improved insurance policy. If the
potential injurer's unreasonable behavior subsequently injures
the potential victim, their agreement will more or less automat-
ically cause some compensatory payment. As a result, once the
parties reach agreement and the potential injurer sets aside the
premium for the health/life insurance of the group of potential
victims, the injurer has no further responsibility to either the
potential or actual victims. Assuming they have obtained sub-
stantial or complete waivers of tort liability, 0 3 providers of
goods or services have very little incentive to take care of these
potential victims. °4 They have no incentive to relate to the po-
tential victims in caring and attention-giving ways that might
mitigate such a person's eagerness to sue in tort in the event an
101. The "separation thesis" describes a view of the world that sees people
as essentially separate. IMi at 2. According to West, that is an essentially mas-
culine world view. It contrasts sharply with the essentially feminine world
view that primarily sees people as connected. IMi If one characterizes neocon-
tractual analysis as male legal thought, many of the comments in this section
about the incomplete nature of neocontract's world view would be most easily
recognized by those steeped in feminist jurisprudence.
102. See, eg., P. HUBER, supra note 7, at 195-96.
103. Priest has thoroughly studied actual warranty contracts in the area of
products liability. He reported that such agreements never provided for liabil-
ity for personal injury on the part of the product manufacturer or seller. Ses-
sion One Discussion, supra note 11, at 2232. Richard Epstein concurred that
when such a result was the obvious contractual optimum, such uniformity
should be expected. Id. at 2233-34.
104. The extent of a provider's incentives relates directly to the level of
compensation he must pay pursuant to the tort waiver agreement. Under the
"pure" AC school approach, that level will approach zero. Cf. id at 2233 (stat-
ing that consumers may be unwilling to shift contractually the risk of injury to
producers because of moral costs). Under the modified approaches of Huber
and O'Connell, the level of compensation will be somewhat higher. See supra
text accompanying notes 33-43. The higher it is, the greater will be the pro-
vider's incentive to avoid injuring the potential victims. Even were such com-
pensation levels quite high, they would provide substantially less incentive to




injury did occur.10 5 Once an injury occurs, the providers have
no incentive to listen to, respond to, or take care of the victim.
The victim gets her prearranged compensation regardless of the
provider's behavior. In short, once the actual contract is signed,
the provider has every incentive to ignore the potential victim.
This neocontractual blindness to connection shows up else-
where. The dominant images in the writing of arch-neocontrac-
tualists Peter Huber and Richard Epstein are of persons or
businesses about to be overcome or annihilated by others. Ep-
stein bemoans the passing of the privity requirement in prod-
ucts liability law because, in the absence of contract's potential
for control, the skillful and watchful people' 6 will have their
pockets picked by the incompetent and careless. 10 7 Huber's
book highlights stories of innocent actors done in by the law-
suits and threatened lawsuits of others. For example, he identi-
fies one individual entrepreneur, whom he describes as
"pioneering," who stopped providing a cheap, innovative way
for Americans to own small airplanes, not because he did any-
thing wrong, but because he feared the lawsuits of others. 08
Such images typify the subscribers to the separation thesis,
whose dominant world view is of hostile "others" threatening
to invade their lives.10 9
The result of this view is, of course, the missed opportunity
that accompanies any one-sided world view. Neocontract
misses the opportunity for the development of relationships
and cooperation tort law provides. 110 The threat of tort liability
105. When potential victims also are potential tort plaintiffs, the provider
of goods or services often will interact with them in certain ways - usually
friendly ways - in the belief that such interactions will minimize the poten-
tial victim's inclination to sue if he becomes an actual victim. Medical profes-
sionals, for example, have given considerable attention to improving the way
they deal routinely with their patients, as a means of protecting against mal-
practice claims.
106. In which category Epstein no doubt includes himself. See, e.g., Session
One Discussion, supra note 11, at 2223.
107. See Epstein, Products Liability, supra note 28, at 660.
108. P. HUBER, supra note 7, at 4, 156. Throughout his book, Huber plays
this theme of the good guys threatened with or actually attacked by hostile
others wielding tort law. See, e.g., id. at 3-4 (opening litany of "good" activities
closed down by tort), 111-12 (discussing the "guerrilla warfare" waged by
classes of persistent plaintiffs who cash in on emotion while defendants "pay
dearly" to escape legal uncertainty of tort), 159 (noting that providers of or-
phan drugs, desperately needed by small groups of victims of rare diseases,
were chased away from the United States by tort liability).
109. See supra note 101.
110. Often tort law will engender strikingly adversarial relationships,
which few would regard as socially valuable. Thus, I stress that tort law pro-
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encourages providers to pay attention to the safety of recipients
of those goods and services before and after accidents occur. In
short, providers/injurers and recipients/injured must relate to
one another, in an atmosphere of mutual responsibility."1 This
creates the opportunity for cooperative behavior in a multitude
of ways that can better the lives of all concerned.
This shows up clearly, for example, in the relations be-
tween doctor and patient, one of the principal areas in which
neocontract approaches have been advocated. Tort rules about
informed consent have changed doctor-patient relationships, so
their conversations about treatment are much fuller than in the
era of doctor decision-making. Patients take more responsibil-
ity for the course of their own treatment. Doctors, even though
they give up some control, likewise take more real responsibil-
ity for the lives of their patients, because they now must deal
with the real desires and understandings of those patients,
rather than with the imagined preferences that governed
before informed consent."l 2
The result of this tort-induced relationship and cooperation
is not clear.'- 3 Because its articulators have so regularly seen
vides an opportunity for relationships and cooperation. Over time, if persons
and institutions must continually heed each other, more satisfactory social ar-
rangements will be worked out than if they may easily ignore one another.
111. Tort's comparative fault and avoidable consequences rules make the)
injured responsible for minimizing the risks and extent of injury. Claim set-
tlement practices make the injured responsible for discovering ways the in-
jurer can assist her recovery.
112. See, e.g., J. KATZ, THE SILENT WOLD OF DOCTOR AND PATIENT 82-84,
130-64 (1984). The fact that the realities of the doctor-patient relationship
often do not approach the informed consent ideal of real conversations should
not obscure tort's general encouragement of better doctor-patient
communication.
113. A very bright, acerbic colleague asked, on reading an earlier draft of
this section, whether the ethic of care in tort would require toy manufacturers
to "go down to the hospital and change his [the victim's] bedpans?" Something
in me reacted immediately: "No, no, I didn't mean that." On reflection, I sus-
pect that immediate reaction came from the autonomy orientation that most of
us (males?) (professors?) have. I also suspect that it would be a typical reac-
tion. Further reflection convinces me it is also the wrong reaction. It may be
that changing victims' bedpans is exactly what providers of defective toys
should be doing in response to child-crippling accidents. Perhaps not. Regard-
less, immediate rejection of the bedpan-change approach displays a mind too
closed to alternative approaches to the problem of accidental injuries. Alter-
natives exist, both in the way providers and recipients interact around safety
before an accident and in the way they, as injurers and injured, interact after
an accident. People explore such alternatives when they have to relate to each
other. Tort law requires that. Neocontract's AC school leaves little room for
such ongoing relationships. Perhaps, to our surprise, changing bedpans would
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tort as an area of law aimed at governing the chance encounters
of strangers, they have paid little attention to tort's potential
for inducing cooperation. Neocontractual analysis may benefit
tort by highlighting the considerable extent to which pre-injury
relationships exist. Nevertheless, fuller understanding of tort's
relational dimensions and their implications awaits fuller recog-
nition of those dimensions by the parties, judges, and scholars.
I am confident only that beneficial solutions to the problem of
accidental injury are more likely to be achieved through the
kind of constant relating required by tort than by the splendid
ignoring permitted by neocontract.
At least one neocontractualist seems to recognize relations
are important, but he does so in a limited way. Part of the com-
municative genius of Peter Huber lies in his recognition of the
competing tugs of autonomy and connectedness in people. He
constantly plays to that tension, repeating consent and coopera-
tion as values advanced by neocontract. 114 Huberian coopera-
tion, however, will not build you a barn. It is very thin, very
limited cooperation. People cooperate to make agreements not
to have tort lawsuits. The cooperation needed in such deeply
personal relationships as those among doctors and patients 1 is
not: "I will give you money now so you will leave me alone
when things get tough for you." Cooperation in leaving each
other alone - what Huber's cooperation amounts to - rarely
forges productive connections among people.
In parallel fashion, neocontractualists seem to focus on pro-
cedural justice, to the exclusion of substantive justice. The AC
school seems to believe that if procedures can be created, in
which potential injurers and victims can make agreements
about what will happen in the event of accidents, the results of
those agreements will be just. This focus on procedural justice
is typical of autonomy-focused law." 6 Such a focus usually
avoids looking at the substantive justice of what the law man-
turn out to be the best way for injurers and victims to interact in a very diffi-
cult relationship. If so, neocontract is unlikely to get us there. Provid-
ers/injurers and recipients/victims have a thin relationship, frozen at an early
time, under the AC school scheme. Tort forces them to bump up against each
other more regularly and continually. Such fuller contact contains the poten-
tial for creative, richer solutions to the injury problems.
114. See, e.g., P. HUBER, supra note 7, at 189, 227.
115. This is one of the areas in which some theorists advance the case for
actual liability-limiting contracts. See Epstein, Medical Malpractice, supra
note 31, at 149.
116. See, e.g., P. NONET & P. SELZNICK, LAW AND SOCIETY IN TRANSITION:
TowARD REsPONsrvE LAW 66-68 (1978).
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dates or allows to happen. It means that the law asks only if
the parties agreed. The law thereby fails to ask if the agree-
ment was fair." 7
a. The Prison of Abstraction
In addition to the limits imposed by the prison of the au-
tonomous world view, neocontract self-imposes a prison of ab-
straction. This tendency to abstraction is evident in the IC
school, by definition, because the theorists must imagine what
people would agree on, in an unreal state of impartiality." 8
This abstraction is chosen deliberately. Without it, no nice,
neat theory of the just and the unjust can be constructed. If
consensual arrangements are at the heart of what Americans
believe just," 9 then, according to the IC school, the way to at-
tain justice in tort rules is to determine rules upon which peo-
ple would agree.
Although useful, this analytic tool is dangerous, precisely
because of its apparent neutral scientific rigor, deriving tort
rules carefully from first principles discovered in consent-based
analysis. 20 Such apparent scientific rigor masks the biased na-
ture of the later-required imagining. That imagining amounts
to little more than the particular theorist's notions about what
people like he would agree to, given the need to attend to possi-
ble bad outcomes.' 12 More insidiously, the images of the agree-
ing group that neocontractualists carry around with them tend
to be of people like them, particularly in terms of gender and
race.2 Because these people are imagined, they tend to lack
117. For a more detailed critique of contractualist tunnel-vision along these
lines, see M. SANDEL, LIBERALISM AND THE LIms OF JUSTICE 104-122 (1982).
118. The AC school also is considerably abstract. It initially seems more
concrete because it would have tort situations settled by actual agreements
among real people. At least in the pure AC school, theorists do not predeter-
mine the agreement. The AC school theorists, however, also imagine what
that world of actual agreements would look like. As will be noted infra text
accompanying notes 185-209, that abstraction creates difficulties for the AC
school, because it significantly blurs the theorists' vision as to what that actual
contracting world will look like.
119. See Schwartz, Proposals, supra note 16, at 357.
120. Alan Schwartz's article is an extremely good example of legal rules
carefully deduced from seemingly obvious starting points. I&i
121. For example, Richard Epstein's concern about protection of the
watchful and skilful consumer. Epstein, Products Liability, supra note 28, at
660. Epstein clearly sees himself in that group. See, e.g., Session One Discus-
sion, supra note 11, at 2236. Accordingly, he will imagine agreements more
like those watchful and skilful people will make.
122. See, e.g., Matsuda, supra note 19, at 615-17; Okin, Justice and Gender,
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the full complexity of real people. 23
Not only is this imagining likely to be inaccurate, it is also
likely to be incomplete. We can learn something about princi-
ples of justice by the attempts of neocontractualists to derive
such principles from the imagined agreements of imaginary
people. We could learn as much by trying to derive these first
principles of justice from people's shared experiences. Feminist
scholars increasingly look to consciousness-raising - the shar-
ing of life experiences among members of a group - as a
method of legal philosophy for discovering basic justice princi-
ples.'24 This same idea of a collective focus on the particulari-
ties of real-life experience as critical to justice determinations
forms part of John Attanasio's philosophy of aggregate auton-
omy. 25 Neocontractual analysis seeks to abstract real-world
problems. Tort currently does just the opposite: for the most
part, its rules are molded in the context of actual cases and con-
troversies, involving real injuries, real people and real events.
Because the law seeks sensibly to solve the problems tort situa-
tions pose, a place as divorced from reality as the IC school is
not the best place to look for a just solution to those problems.
2. Missing realities
Another significant problem with the predetermined law of
neocontract, clearly related to its abstract character, is its char-
acteristic blindness to certain kinds of realities, a blindness not
shared by tort. I discuss in Part I. B. the particularly impor-
tant pieces of reality undercutting both the AC and IC-insur-
ance 26 schools of neocontract. This section explains the
dissonance between the neocontractual theorists' views of real-
ity and reality itself.
16 PHiL. & PUB. AFF. 42, 45-47, 69-72 (1987). This is not to say that IC school
theorists are racist or sexist, or that they see a homogeneous agreeing group.
Rather, the nature of the process of imagining agreements leads to conclusions
that will differ depending on who the imaginers are. If we need to think
deeply about what people will agree to, we are likely to imagine their reac-
tions based on our own reactions and those of persons we know best. That
naturally builds a "like-us" bias into the imaginings, which in turn mutes theimaginings of those unlike us. Such persons are particularly likely to include
those of a different race.
123. Okin, supra note 122, at 71-72.
124. See, e.g., Matsuda, supra note 19, at 622.
125. Attanasio, supra note 19, at 700.
126. The IC-insurance school of neocontract is that part of the imagined
contracts school of neocontract that deduces optimal levels of compensation in




This dissonance stems in part from the auton-
omy/abstraction characteristics of neocontract just discussed. It
also stems from the related theoretical mindset of the neocon-
tractualists. They offer a particular theory as the guide to the
decision of all tort situations. It is no surprise that this form of
analysis has grown more prominent in tort: tort scholarship in
the 1980s has tended increasingly to the theoretical.m The
danger, again, lies in overemphasis on theory, which is just
what the neocontractualists do.'2 Theory itself is much to
blame, as is the particular theoretical viewpoint of neocontract.
A quasi-religious "right vision" seems to persist in heavily
theoretical approaches to tort. The most obvious example is
the work of Richard Posner, which by its abundance and
breadth of intelligence and information'2 has dominated the
use of economic analysis in tort. Although awed and influenced
by Posner's work, I am not persuaded that tort law runs almost
unfailingly on the efficiency track. Judge Posner's writing
leaves me with the sense that were he to spend a day with my
family, he would be able to write an article explaining all of
our behavior - why we talk to the dog, why we go to the bath-
room; why we eat, sleep, and drink as we do; why we play
Guess Who instead of Sorry; - as fully consistent with his the-
ories.130 That simply is not consistent with my experience of
how my life works.
Neocontract, of course, has its own theoretical constructs-
for example, autonomy and the separation thesis discussed in
the preceding subsection. Its slavish devotion to its theory,
however, is no different than Posner's. This is illustrated in the
detailed architecture of Alan Schwartz's consumer sovereignty
127. See Schwartz, Directions in Contemporary Products Liability Scholar-
ship, 14 J. LEGAL STUD. 763, 764 (1985).
128. It is just what tort law does not do, given its context of individual
cases and the presence of juries.
129. Posner's early works explicating the economic basis for legal decision
fell to a large extent into the tort area. See, eg., Posner, A Theory of Negli-
gence, 1 J. LEGAL. STUD. 29 (1972). Posner writes more than almost anyone.
He displays the breadth of his knowledge in a work that analyzes the rele-
vance of Aristotelian ethics to his wealth maximization theory about law. See
Posner, The Concept of Corrective Justice in Recent Theories of Tort Law, 10 J.
LEGAL STUD. 187 (1981). His fullest thinking is embodied in R. POSNER AND
W. LAsNDES, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTuRE OF TORT LAw (1987).
130. This may sound unfair to Posner, a serious and often brilliant scholar.
It is not meant to slight his work. Nevertheless, these feelings comprise an
important and dominant part of my reaction to his work as a whole. My con-




theory,131 in the discovered and embraced contractarian theory
of Kim Scheppele, 132 in the common insurance as optimal com-
pensation theory, 3 3 and in other neocontractual approaches.
These theories work for some people, some times, in some
circumstances. How well they work will depend on time, place,
culture, and conditions. If you have people who value only au-
tonomy, then neocontract is for you. If you have people who
are all rational wealth maximizers, then step right up to the
wealth maximization system. What seems right for Americans
may not seem right for the Chinese. The tort law of the De-
pression and of the sixties may not seem right for the nineties.
The problem is, of course, that most of us have a fair number of
the characteristics that we ascribe to different times, places, or
cultures mixed in with more dominant characteristics. Theory,
including neocontractual theory, does not allow for those other
characteristics - non-rationality, community, unstructuredness
- to come in when decisions about law are being made. As a
result, theory-driven decisions about law are incomplete. They
do not fit very well with people's lived experience. Recognition
of this has led some respected recent scholarship to emphasize
that examiners of tort rules must pay close attention to impor-
tant differences in fact patterns that arise in different types of
accident settings.13
Neocontractual theory seems particularly ill-equipped to
pay that sort of close attention. Neocontract, it must be
remembered, espouses decisions made ex ante, in the "coolness
of the beforehand."'1 5 It views tort disdainfully as "emotional,
reactive, and coercive."'136 Unfortunately, the world of acciden-
tal injuries is full of emotion and pain. It is a messy world, in
which the unexpected happens, throwing people's lives into an
unpredictable uproar. Tort law already imposes substantial or-
der on this world by requiring any injured person who wishes
to obtain compensation to fit her unique situation into certain
preformed pigeonholes, such as, "negligence" and "causation."
It may be, as the neocontractualists would argue, that it is de-
sirable to impose even more order on that messy world, and to
131. See Schwartz, PrposaZs, supra note 16, at 357-67.
132. See K. SCHEPPELE, supra note 10, at 301.
133. See, ag., Danzon, supra note 54, at 520-33.
134. Calabresi and Kievorick, Four Tests for Liability in Torts, 14 J. LEGAL
STUD. 585, 626 (1985); Komesar, Injuries and Institutions: Tort Reform, Tort
Theory and Beyond, 65 N.Y.U. L. REV. 23, 33-50 (1990).
135. P. HUBER, supra note 7, at 226.
136. Id at 191.
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impose it from a place that is quite far away from the heat and
messiness. To the extent that is done, much of the reality of
the world of accidents will be drained from the decisions about
its rules. 37 For example, Peter Huber is able from his de-
tached viewpoint to see litigation over the allegedly harmful ef-
fects of the drug Bendectin as symptomatic of the irrationality
of the tort system.1 sa Most courts and juries found that the al-
legedly teratogenic drug did not cause birth defects. Some
found that it did. Huber paints a horrific picture of the effects
of such inconsistent judgments. 3 9 What he fails to acknowl-
edge is that such inconsistency may more accurately reflect re-
ality than would a uniform response to the same legal issue of
causation. That so many of the Bendectin cases went to trial
strongly suggests that plaintiffs' lawyers found enough evidence
connecting Bendectin to their clients' birth defects to give them
a good chance of convincing a jury and reviewing judges that
causation existed. Because losing plaintiffs' lawyers come away
emptyhanded, and because they will not be in business long if
they come away empty too often, their judgments have the ring
of sincerity and some authority. In light of whatever evidence
was so convincing to plaintiffs' lawyers, a situation in which
Bendectin is absolved from responsibility in most cases may
show simply that it probably did not cause the plaintiffs' birth
defects, although it may have.4'3 That is inconsistent. It sends
137. I am reminded of a film I saw the night before organizing this section
of this Article: The Dream Team, starring, among others, Michael Keaton.
The film is about the adventures of four seriously mentally ill patients, acci-
dentally released onto the streets of New York City for a few days. One of the
four constantly tries to impose order on his disorderly world. In one scene, he
takes forever to traverse a city block, because he is constantly picking up the
litter left by other people. He then follows one litterer into a bar and sits be-
tween two men who eat and drink sloppily. When the lunatic chastises each of
his neighbors and tries to nag them into cleaning up their spaces, they turn on
him angrily and toss him back into the street. Perhaps these segments of the
film are a useful reminder that attempting to impose too much order on a
messy world can be viewed in some contexts as madness.
138. P. HUBER, supra note 7, at 102.
139. I& at 209.
140. I use the example of Bendectin because Huber pays considerable at-
tention to it. He asserts that the scientific evidence overwhelmingly shows
Bendectin does not cause birth defects. Id at 102. I am not in a position to
evaluate Huber's knowledge about Bendectin. Others who have checked care-
fully into some of his book's factual conclusions have found them occasionally
inaccurate. See, e.g., Hager, supra note 7, at 571; Henderson and Eisenberg,
The Quiet Revolution in Products Liability: An Empirical Study of Legal
Change, 37 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 479, 481 n.7 (1990). Regardless, if a case can make
it past a trial judge's review of motions for a directed verdict and for judgment
notwithstanding the verdict, past a jury's group consideration of carefully
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unclear messages. And, it reflects realities. There may be
more orderliness and clarity when decisions are made ex ante.
Such orderliness and clarity may be undesirable when the
rules attempt to reflect a disorderly and unclear world. An ac-
curate portrait of a blurry scene is a blurry portrait.14'
3. Disempowering victims
One of the themes recurring in even contractarian discus-
sions about just societies is the need to attend to those persons
who lose as a result of law-created social arrangements' 4 2
Such persons, accident victims, traditionally have been the fo-
cus of tort law. Because tort rules often receive their impetus
and direction from the goal of deterring unsafe behavior, tort
also is concerned with potential victims. Nevertheless, its main
concern always has been actual victims. Neocontract, on the
other hand, is concerned primarily with non-victims. It does
much less for injured people than does tort, under either school
of neocontractual thought.143 Predetermined law proves prob-
lematic to the extent that concern for victims is a valid societal
goal.
Neocontractual theorists would rightly respond by pointing
out that by having actual ex ante agreements, or by reducing
tort recoveries to take account of what people would have
agreed to ex ante, people generally would be better off, and ac-
presented evidence, and past an appellate court's scrutiny of the sufficiency of
the evidence, it would seem that at least some impartial people, more directly
informed than Mr. Huber, do not share his view that the scientific evidence is
so overwhelming against causation.
141. See Scales, supra note 99, at 1388; see also L. WrrTGENsTEIN, PHILo-
SOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS 71, at 34 (G. Anscombe trans., 3d ed. 1958): "Is an
indistinct photograph a picture of a person at all? Is it even always an advan-
tage to replace an indistinct picture by a sharp one? Isn't the indistinct one
often exactly what we need?").
142. John Rawls, the leading modern exponent of contractarian analysis
(i.e., looking at what people in the "original position" would agree to, to deter-
mine first principles of a just society) articulated the "difference principle" as
a central feature of his theory of justice. That principle requires that decisions
about the distributions of benefits in society should not worsen the condition
of the least disadvantaged members of society. J. RAWLS, supra note 10, at 78-
83; see also K. SCHEPPELE, supra note 10, at 311-12 (stating that in a con-
tractarian society, "members are routinely concerned with making social and
political institutions acceptable to those who might be adversely affected by
them").
143. Neocontract of the dnd articulated by Jeffrey O'Connell would not
attend less well to injury victims than would tort, because the victims would




tual victims would be unsubstantially worse off."' It is not
clear that this is so, as Part II. C. discusses. Nevertheless, it
seems probable that, due to the high transaction costs of the
tort system, almost any neocontractual plan would put more
money in consumers' hands than they have with the tort sys-
tem. Of course, consumers will have given up a substantial
amount of "goods" to get that additional money.145
One of the principal losses for consumers will be power;
power in the sense of that same self-determination that con-
cerns neocontractualists. Predetermined law glories in the idea
that choice is returned to individuals, and, thus, empowers
them.14 Despite these claims, neocontract offers consumers
limited choices. It is potential injurers, the real focus of the AC
school, 147 who gain substantial choice under its theories. At the
same time, consumers have substantially less choice and sub-
stantially less individual power under neocontract, particularly
if those consumers are injured.
On this point, it is important to recognize that when the
AC school of neocontractualists talks of giving people more
choice, it is focusing on the choices available to potential injur-
ers, not potential victims.148 I will discuss later how tort gives
recipients/victims more real choice and neocontract less choice
than the neocontractualists contend. 149 Neocontract gives con-
sumers access to some goods and services that a court might
find unreasonably dangerous. It also makes many goods and
services more affordable by lowering providers' liability costs.
That greater affordability must be discounted by the amount
144. See, e.g., Schwartz, Proposals, supra note 16, at 357-61.
145. Consumers will have more money either because they will be given
money in exchange for giving up some of their future tort rights, or because
goods and services will become cheaper, as a result of reductions in providers'
liability costs. What consumers will give up, in terms of safety and compensa-
tion, to get that additional money will be discussed infra text accompanying
notes 226-57.
146. See, e.g., P. HUBER, supra note 7, at 207-13.
147. The writings of Huber and Epstein, who are at the forefront of the AC
school, focus overwhelmingly on the problems posed for providers of goods
and services, and their insurers, by current tort law. See, e.g., P. HUBER, supra
note 7, at 227; Epstein, Unintended Revolution, supra note 31, at 2196; Epstein,
Products Liability, supra note 28, at 646; Huber, supra note 65, at 279.
148. Of course there is no neat test that divides us into potential injurer
and victim categories. We are more obviously in one category or the other.
Some persons and entities are more clearly potential injurers much of the
time; for example, surgeons and pesticide manufacturers. The neocontractual-
ists focus more on the choices of those in the potential injurer role.
149. See infra text accompanying notes 227-40.
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the consumer would pay to replace the health, wage, and suf-
fering insurance the tort system previously provided.
In contrast to this rather modest gain in choice for consum-
ers, providers of goods and services will find their choices ex-
panded tremendously under the AC school. They will be able
to choose whether to expose themselves to liability to their con-
sumers. Even if a cushion of some minimal compensation is re-
quired, the providers still will have choice of designs, behaviors,
and processes available that they previously considered unavail-
able. That perceived unavailability occurs because the provid-
ers thought there was a serious chance courts would find that
choice unreasonable. In fact, behavior choices that would have
been ruled unreasonable will be available because providers no
longer will face the prospect of paying full injury costs.150
More important in this analysis of choice is to recognize the
substantial loss of choice and loss of autonomy for the potential
victim and the actual victim that will result from neocontract.
All of us potential victims will lose choice because providers
will have a weaker or nonexistent incentive to pay attention to
us, an incentive now provided by our threat to use the tort sys-
tem if injured.151 All of us, potential and actual victims alike,
will lose choice because neocontract would remove the pressure
to develop new legal theories of accountability. 152 That pres-
sure will dissipate because people will not get goods or services
in the absence of an agreement not to sue in tort, and thus, tort
suits in many fields will disappear. To get a sense of the signifi-
cance of such a development, think about what the legal rules
determining responsibility for injury-causing behavior would
look like now if they had been frozen in place by a similar ne-
ocontractual system thirty or forty years ago.153 Think, too,
150. See id. By full injury costs, I mean the dollar amount a jury would
award an injured person if focusing solely on the traditional judicial instruc-
tion that they award damages sufficient to make the plaintiff whole, to return
him to the position he would have been in had the defendant not behaved
unreasonably.
151. For a fuller treatment of this idea, see the discussion supra text ac-
companying notes 103-04.
152. See, e.g., Galanter, Bhopal in America, America in Bhopal: Legal Re-
sponses to Industrial Disaster 5-6 (Jan. 8, 1988) (unpublished paper on file
with author) (comparing role of lawyer in tort in the United States and India).
153. Think, for example, whether there would be any woman in 1949 who
would not have signed willingly a waiver of any rights to recover damages for
loss of consortium she might suffer from a defendant's product. Tort law then
gave her no right to such damages. If such waivers had been validated by
courts, would the law have moved, beginning with Hitaffer v. Argonne Co., 183
F.2d 811, 819 (D.C. Cir.), cert denied, 340 U.S. 852 (1950), to recognize a wife's
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about hazards such as asbestos, the Dalkon Shield, and the
Pinto gas tank, which would never have been addressed by gov-
ernment regulators had societal views of responsibility not been
pushed forward by tort suits. In addition, all of us will lose
choices under neocontract as large enterprises move even fur-
ther from social controls. Tort law now makes a large corpora-
tion accountable by calling it before a court to accept
responsibility for injuries it causes. This ethic of accountability
will decline as injuries become just another statistically certain
cost, paid off by the accounting department.
It will be the victim herself who will face the major loss of
autonomy. Accidents that maim or kill impose severe con-
straints on choice, perhaps the most severe people ever face.lM
In the actual contract regime, injured persons faced with such
severe constraints will suddenly find they have given up one of
the very few slices of power provided the injured in our society:
the power provided to victims by tort.
This empowerment comes in several forms. First, tort
gives the victim the opportunity to tell her story about the aw-
fulness of what happened to her. 55 She will be assisted in
presenting that story by a trained articulator. She will be
heard by a judge and jury, symbols of justice and of his commu-
nity. This opportunity to speak and be heard about personal
tragedy may be the most important feature of tort for accident
victims, more important in some ways than obtaining monetary
compensation.156 There also is a strong community interest in
hearing the voices of those who have been seriously wronged,
an interest reflected in the extraordinary openness of Ameri-
can courts to citizen complaints.
Second, tort provides seriously injured persons' 57 with an
cause of action for loss of consortium? Such recognition has become the law
throughout the United States. These decisions have furthered the legal rights
and status of women.
154. See, e.g., Attanasio, supra note 19, at 724.
155. This seemed an important object to many of the veterans and their
families who brought suit against the chemical companies who supplied Agent
Orange. At the hearings concerning the fairness of the class action settlement
in that case, the class members frequently spoke of the importance of their
"day in court," when they would have the opportunity to tell their stories to
people who would listen carefully and respond morally. P. SCHucK, AGENT
ORANGE ON TRIAL: MAss ToXIc DISASTERS IN THE CouRTS 174-77 (1986).
156. A New Jersey study found that the objective individual litigants' most
common reason for participating in adjudicatory proceedings was "to tell my
side of the story." Hensler, supra note 82, at 99.
157. I purposely focus on seriously injured persons in talking about the dis-
empowering effects of neocontract. Such a focus seems most consistent with
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important measure of control over their own lives. Most such
persons suffer considerably, both physically and emotionally
from their injuries.158 Tort gives such persons the power to call
to account those who have injured them. Victims find powerful
allies in the form of plaintiffs' personal injury lawyers. With
that strong assistance, the victim can require a response from
those she believes injured her. Unlike injurers in the neocon-
tractual scheme, injurers sued in tort cannot ignore the victim,
no matter how much bigger, stronger, and more important they
are. The victim is able to get information about what hap-
pened. 5 9 The claimed injurers must answer her questions and
charges, in a setting in which she will have the opportunity to
challenge their versions of what happened. Should she win, or
obtain a settlement, the victim will have received some in-
dependent validation of her suffering.160 She very likely will
feel some satisfaction at having punished her injurer and at
having sent a message to those like her injurer that they cannot
act in that injury-producing manner with impunity. 16 ' One psy-
chological study of litigation concluded that successful resolu-
tion of a lawsuit was an important factor in the improved
mental health of victims traumatized by a disaster.162 In sum,
tort permits the victim to reassert control over her own life,
both by the manner in which it proceeds and by the financial
boost that results from a favorable outcome.
Finally, when an injured person has sued, or may sue, an
contractarian notions that any system of law must be justified, at least in part,
by reference to its treatment of the least-advantaged. See, e.g., K. SCHEPPELE,
supra note 10, at 311. In addition, the law related to compensation for and pre-
vention of injuries should be most concerned with those victims who most
need the help offered by legal remedies. Mildly injured persons, for the most
part, will be able to resume their normal lives without government
intervention.
158. See, eg., Hutchinson, Beyond No-Fault, 73 CALIF. L. REv. 755, 763
(1985) ('"The victim's agony is not merely the physical pain, but the frightening
realization that she has been destroyed as a person."); see also G. GLESER, B.
GREEN & C. WINGEr, PROLONGED PSYCHosOCAL EFFECTS OF DISASTER: A
STUDY OF BUFFALO CREEK 64-66 (1981) [hereinafter BUFFALO CREEK] (report-
ing cases of psychopathology among disaster victims).
159. This seemed to be an important object of the Agent Orange litigation.
See P. SCHUCK, supra note 155, at 256.
160. See BUFFALO CREEK, supra note 158, at 129.
161. This was a commonly expressed feeling after the citizens of Buffalo
Creek, West Virginia settled their litigation against the coal company that had
permitted a dam to break, flooding the valley where they lived. K. ERIKSON,
EVERYTHING IN ITS PATH: DESTRUCTION OF COMMUNITY IN THE BUFFALO
CREEK FLOOD 248-49 (1976).
162. BUFFALO CREEK, supra note 158, at 129.
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injurer, the latter must deal with that victim, and must deal
with the realities of that victim's injuries. That dealing may
happen in many forms: the alleged tortfeasor may play "hard-
ball" litigation, may settle claims cheerfully or grudgingly, may
assist the victim to put his life back together in nonmonetary
ways, or may seek help in resolving a dispute with the victim
from non-tort sources. Whatever the means, the injurer and in-
jured will have to relate to one another, probably even more
closely and intensely than they did before the accident.
This required relationship means that the solutions to the
individual or group's accident problems in some way will be a
joint solution: the parties will have worked on it together.163
They will have done that work in the context of what really
happened. Were the accident situation governed by a contrac-
tual clause drawn up by the parties long before the accident,
the parties would have crafted a solution to the problems posed
by the accident in a faraway world of imagining about what the
accident problems might be. That faraway world would be at
an even greater distance because the imagining at the time of
contract formation would have focused on classes of potential
victims and accidents, rather than on the particular injured in-
dividual or the particular situation.
Unlike neocontract, tort has no predetermined law created
in a faraway place. The injurer must deal with the victim and
the situation as it really is. This reality-based "dealing" creates
the potential for transforming accident situations, and the rela-
tions between victims and injurers or society, in satisfying
ways. As a result of the present threat of litigation and judg-
ment, tort creates a constant pressure on the parties to create a
mutually satisfying relationship, even if only a relationship of
payor and payee.164 Tort, by not allowing injurers to walk away
from victims, creates many possibilities: new kinds of settle-
ments, such as structured settlements that more fully meet
each party's needs;165 new forms of dispute resolution, such as
163. Even if the solution takes the form of a judgment for or against one of
the parties by a third party, such as a court, the result will be one in which the
parties have worked in relation to one another throughout the process. To a
large extent, the nature of that relationship will dictate the final result chosen
by a judge or jury, although the final result will more obviously come from the
parties if they are able to construct some solution.
164. Or, (to put it in neocontractualist terms) which maximizes joint
utility.
165. See generally D. HINDERT, J. DEHNER & P. HINDERT, STRUCTURED
SLEr N AND PERIODIC PAYMENT JUDGMENTs (1986).
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the Wellington Agreement that guided some of the asbestos lit-
igation;L66 and even new non-monetary ways of dealing with ac-
cidental injury, such as reportedly occurred in Japan after an
airplane crash, when the president of the airline personally
went to the homes of the victims' families to apologize.167
As the above subsections show, the ex ante style of dispute
resolution and the philosophy underlying neocontractual analy-
sis unnecessarily limit the search for substantive justice and in-
dividual fulfillment in the context of accidental injuries. The
next subsection examines the blindness of neocontract to par-
ticular realities of the accident world. The following subsection
discusses the substantial benefits, in addition to self-determina-
tion, people now gain from tort law.
B. THE FLAWED VISION OF REALrrY
As we have seen, a prime characteristic of an ex ante ap-
proach to problem solving is its abstraction, its distance from
the reality of the problems it seeks to solve. That characteris-
tic, therefore, places a premium on clear vision: if you are go-
ing to decide matters before they happen, you better be a good
prognosticator. The neocontractual theorists who have brought
their pre-vision to bear on tort situations are not.
The neocontractualists' flawed vision of reality shows up
principally in three areas. First, they are inadequate imaginers
of reality. Second, the AC school in particular posits a decision-
making system of actual agreements that misperceives people's
relative abilities to make agreements about future risks, and
that cannot work logistically. Finally, the AC school's imagin-
ings designed to ascertain optimal compensation levels for tort
have both a misguided analytical look and an incomplete under-
standing of what tort provides.
1. Inadequate Imaginings
Because neocontract insists on deciding what will happen
in tort situations ex ante, it must imagine the decisional rules
to which people would agree. Except for the "pure" approach
to actual contract, the same is true for the theorists of the AC
school. They must decide on the nature of the "cushion" or
the limited kinds of transactions that will frame the actual con-
166. See Wellington, Asbestos: The Private Management of A Public Prob-
lem, 33 CLEv. ST. L. REv. 375, 378-90 (1984-85).
167. See Wagatsuma & Rosett, The Implications of Apology: Law and Cul-
ture in Japan and the United States, 20 LAW & SoC'Y REV. 461, 488 (1986).
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tracts.'6 The fact that this imagining is done from a distance
makes it very likely that decisions will distort reality. This
likelihood of distortion is confirmed by some of the imaginings
of the principal theorists.
In the section on the abstract nature of the neocontractual-
ist approach,169 I pointed out some of the reality-perceiving
flaws inherent in imagining. Such imaginings cannot help but
reflect the particular ideas and values of the theorist. For ex-
ample, should Richard Posner start looking for a consumer sov-
ereignty norm to govern products liability law, he probably
would imagine wealth maximization as the most important
value of the people.' 70 More significantly, the imaginers of tort
theory have been, and are likely to remain, dominantly white
male legal academics. Critics of Rawls-like approaches, such as
those offered by the neocontractualists, argue that these au-
thors are inevitably ethnocentric in imagining about agreeing
people. 17 ' The people are like them. Not surprisingly, the one
woman in the fore of current neocontractual thought, Kim
Scheppele, has articulated a contractarian theory of law focus-
ing more on equality and community. 172
These flaws inherent in the technique of ex ante imagining
show up in the actual imaginings of the major tort-focused the-
orists. Huber, for example, has written that Americans gener-
ally are "[a] nation of hypochondriacs,... developing a phobia
toward technology worthy of a primitive tribe."'173 Epstein,
talking about consumer information, emphasizes the availabil-
168. See supra text accompanying notes 37-47.
169. See supra text accompanying notes 98-125.
170. See, e.g., Markovits, Legal Analysis and the Economic Analysis of Allo-
cative Effciency, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 811, 814 (1980); Posner, Wealth Max-
imization Revisited, 2 NOTRE DAME J. L. ETMIcs & PuB. POL'Y 85, 85 (1985).
Interestingly, the particular era in which one does one's imagining is likely to
influence how even the impartial persons in the original position are per-
ceived. See, e.g., Linzer, supra note 11, at 158 (arguing that the message of Ian
Macneil's writings, that parties in relational contracts frequently temper
wealth maximization goals with other objectives, has had much less impact on
scholars than his other messages, "probably because it is politically unpopular
and academically unfashionable in this era of Me Generation wealth
maximization").
171. See, eg., Matsuda, supra note 19, at 619, 624-28; Okin, supra note 122,
at 69-72.
172. K. SCHEPPELE, supra note 10, at 85. Scheppele creates a sense
throughout her book that she looks much harder than do the other neocon-
tractualists to try to see people as they really are and would be. See, e.g., id. at
75.
173. Huber, Eectrophobia, FORBES, Sept. 4, 1989, at 313.
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ity of information in Consumer Reports.1 7" People like Epstein
and I read Consumer Reports. Most do not. Many cannot even
read. They are not included in his imaginings about people who
make agreements. Given Huber's apparent disdain for his fel-
low citizens, it is unclear who would be included in his imagin-
ings. Substantively more serious, albeit less procedurally
alarming, is the imagining engaged in by Alan Schwartz in his
carefully constructed consumer sovereignty model for products
liability rule-determination. 175 In asking what should be the
"meta rule" to determine products liability law, Schwartz iden-
tifies two candidates: a maximin rule, which would direct per-
sons to secure the best possible outcome in the worst state that
could occur; and a utility maximization rule. In less than a par-
agraph, Schwartz dismisses the candidacy of the maximin rule,
largely because his imagined agree-ers "would know that the
worst outcome - incurring serious, completely uncompensated
injury - is substantially mitigated by existing social safety
nets."'176 Certainly the imagined people who "know" this fact
do not include the homeless people Professor Schwartz must
encounter frequently on the streets of New Haven. These
imaginers apparently do not include ten per cent of the nation's
children, who not only live in poverty, but do not even receive
Medicaid health care.177 And, missing from that group of
imaginers seems to be anyone who suffered a serious injury and
was among the eighty per cent of the workforce not protected
by private, long-term disability insurance.178 Working with the-
ories in which small differences in the imagined bargainers can
lead to large differences in the rule results,179 one can hardly
feel sanguine about the nature of the rules about accidents de-
rived by neocontractual analysts.
174. Session One Discussion, supra note 11, at 2235.
175. Schwartz, Proposals, supra note 16, at 357-60.
176. Id. at 359.
177. See Braveman, Children, Poverty and State Constitutions, 38 EMORY
L. J. 577, 581 (1989) (reporting that one out of every five children is living in
poverty); Study Says Medicaid Lags for Poor Children, N.Y. Times, Oct. 23,
1989, at A17, col. 1 (reporting a study by the National Association of Children's
Hospitals and Related Institutions stating that only half of all poor children
are covered by Medicaid).
178. Abraham, Individual Action and Collective Responsibility: The Di-
lemma of Mass Tort Reform, 73 VA. L. RaV. 845, 900 n.121 (1987). Such per-
sons might find protection from wage loss under Social Security Disability
Insurance, but such insurance replaces only from 45 to 80% of income subject
to social security tax, and only after a five-month wait. See S. SUGARMAN,
supra note 44, at 130.
179. Ackerman, supra note 18, at 902.
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In light of the concerns raised here about whether the ne-
ocontractual imaginers can satisfactorily get in touch with real-
ity, one might well ask whether such imaginings are necessary.
Such questioning leads back to the variation on AC school anal-
ysis advanced by Jeffrey O'Connell. 80 O'Connell long has been
concerned with what people really want, particularly if they
are injured or an injurer.'8 ' He believes people want relatively
quick payment of their economic losses. 182 Accordingly, he
presented a products liability proposal that would have re-
quired claimants to accept a defendant's offer to pay their net
economic loss. 8 3 Subsequently, O'Connell seems to have real-
ized that if this is what people really want, then they need not
be coerced into taking it. As a result, he now proposes that
consumers and providers agree ex ante that the provider will
offer payment of net economic loss if the consumer is injured
by its good or service, and that the consumer then may choose
to accept or reject the offer.'84 This proposal suggests an ac-
ceptable way for testing hypotheses about what people really
want in their tort rules and compensation. Such testing could
mean that tort law need not end up blind to what real people
really want.
2. The Misperceiving, Mismanaging AC System
The AC school is a more serious offender in misperceiving
reality. This school essentially seeks to replace the tort system
with a system of private contract.'85 It is full of optimism about
the potential of this change for correcting the ills of the tort
180. See O'Connell, Neo No-Fault, supra note 40, at 906-10. For a fuller
presentation of his variation, see supra text accompanying notes 40-43.
181. See O'Connell, Neo No-Fault, supra note 40, at 905-06. With his partic-
ular focus on what an injury victim might want, O'Connell, unlike some of the
neocontractualists, operates consistently with the traditional contractarian fo-
cus on the effects of rules on the least advantaged.
182. IdM at 901, 911.
183. See Moore & O'Connell, Foreclosing Medical Claims By Prompt
Tender of Economic Loss, 44 LA. L. REV. 1267, 1279-84 (1984).
184. O'Connell, Neo No-Fault, supra note 40, at 906-07.
185. Neither Huber nor Epstein ever spell out a full-blown theory of how
their actual contract systems will work. At times, Huber seems downright
modest about his ambitions, declaiming that all he seeks is that providers have
the power to disclaim tort liability for personal injury. Session Three Discus-
sion, supra note 33, at 2339. What they want is for providers' and consumers'
actual agreements to govern. They are willing to let law set default rules,
those that would govern tort liability in the absence of an agreement by the
parties. Huber recognizes that institutional providers would move quickly to
make use of such disclaimers. See, e.g., P. HUBER, supra note 7, at 60-61.
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system, as is typical of free market advocates. True to their ab-
stract nature, however, the neocontractual theorists do not
heed obvious social realities. Those realities include: a serious
imbalance between providers and consumers in information
about risk; the likelihood that people have a flawed under-
standing of the risks they take; and the presence of overwhelm-
ing obstacles to the execution of such agreements, even if
providers deal with well-informed consumers.
Some aspects of the workings of the AC private contract
system are clear, and some aspects are fuzzy. Clearly there are
imbalances in information and understanding about the risk of
injury from certain goods and services. The provider usually
has significantly greater understanding of the risk factors than
does the consumer. It is clear that consumers generally have
some difficulty processing information about risk. The extent
of those difficulties is unclear, as is whether those difficulties
will cause consumers to underestimate or overestimate risk. It
is clear that actual agreements on any basis other than "take it
or leave it" are very unlikely. Under such circumstances, a sys-
tem that invites providers to bypass long-standing social
prohibitions against unreasonable injury-causing behavior is
insupportable.
a. Information ImbaZances
Providers generally have much greater access to informa-
tion about risk and a greater stake in acquiring that informa-
tion than consumers. Providers have much more access to
information because they usually provide one sort of service or
one kind of product repeatedly. A consumer, even a repeat
consumer, consumes that good or service much less frequently
than the provider provides it. Providers learn about injuries
because injured consumers complain. Consumers usually do
not learn about those injuries unless they receive substantial
publicity or unless they or their friends are injured. Likewise,
the provider has a greater incentive to obtain information about
risk. If the product has risks of personal injury associated with
it, the provider has a significant incentive to discover those
risks, because there is a substantial chance that some injured
person(s) will sue him in tort. The consumer may or may not
have a significant incentive to discover the risks, depending on
whether the good or service poses a high risk. Most goods and
services will pose a low risk of harm to any individual but pose
a fairly high risk of some harm, in the form of a tort suit, to
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any provider. Therefore, the provider generally has a much
greater ability and incentive than the consumer to determine
the risks associated with the product. 8 6
The implications of this information imbalance are unclear,
ominously so for consumers. Consumers were shellacked in the
political process in the 1980s tort rights battles, as collections of
providers more determinedly pursued these goals than did con-
sumers.' 8 7 In fact, the only entity with a continuing pro-plain-
tiff stake in the tort system, the plaintiffs' personal injury bar,
was the only significant player on the side of the potential vic-
tim during the battles over tort "reform." No such "champion"
will be involved on behalf of the less-informed consumer in the
actual agreements contemplated by the AC school. Lack of
representation creates the opportunity for providers to take ad-
vantage of consumers, in the sense of using their superior un-
derstanding of risk factors to gain an advantage they would not
have if consumers shared that understanding. Economic theo-
rizing indicates both that firms do'88 and do not' 89 take advan-
tage of consumers with respect to warranty terms in the face of
information imbalance. Common sense suggests that providers
of goods and services will face considerable incentives to take
advantage of consumers in the AC system. Providers will wish
to pay as little as possible for the waivers of tort liability. They
will pay less if consumers believe the thing provided is not very
dangerous. Therefore, the providers will have an economic in-
centive to downplay the dangers of their products. The market
186. For a more detailed exposition of this idea, see Komesar, supra note
134, at 3841. It is possible that tort will exacerbate the information imbalance,
as people fear that providing information about risk will facilitate and en-
courage tort lawsuits against them. See, eg., Lyndon, I7&formation Economics
and Chemical Toxicity: Designing Laws to Produce and Use Data, 87 MICH. L.
REV. 1795, 1817-18 (1989). On the other hand, much of our knowledge about
the dangers of highly dangerous substances, such as asbestos, certain IUDs,
and all-terrain vehicles, has come from tort suits.
187. Neil Komesar notes that such imbalance in political participation be-
tween potential injurers and potential victims is a natural outgrowth of the
common tort situations. For example, in most products liability cases, the per-
ceived risk of harm to the potential injurer is high, while the perceived risk to
the potential victim is low. Komesar, supra note 134, at 34-35.
188. The firms exploit shopping difficulties by charging inefficiently high
prices. Schwartz, Proposals, supra note 16, at 371, 374; see also Schwartz &
Wilde, Intervening in Markets on the Basis of Imperfect Informatio. A Legal
and Economic Analysis, 127 U. PA. L. REv. 630, 673-74 (1979) (noting that
when comparative price and term information is available to consumers, mar-
kets behave competitively).
189. See Darby & Karni, Free Competition and the Optimal Amount of
Fraud, 16 J. L. AND EcoN. 67, at 79-80 (1973).
1226 [Vol. 74:1177
TORT AND NEOCONTRACT
seems unlikely to correct such behavior, because providers who
start paying more money than their competitors for tort waiv-
ers risk being perceived as providers of more dangerous goods
and services. Besides, there has been no indication of competi-
tion with respect to warranties of safety in the past.19 Huber
suggests the law could require full disclosure of information
about risk to the consumer.'9 ' The courts, however, will pro-
vide little check on less-than-full information disclosure. Most
injured persons do not make claims now, even with the full
panoply of tort rights available to them. 92 Far fewer persons
are likely to bring an action to court when faced with a written
agreement expressly giving up the tort claim. Should an action
reach court, the judge or jury will face the murky issue of how
much information about risk is enough to validate a tort
waiver. Similar issues in the law of informed consent and de-
fective warnings have generated considerable confusion.193
b. Consumer Misunderstanding
Beyond the problem of information imbalance lies the dif-
ficulty consumers have in gaining an accurate understanding of
risk of personal injury. If the AC system is to work, a minimal
prerequisite must be that persons giving up their rights to sue
in tort at least have a pretty good idea about the risks they face.
There is serious doubt about whether consumers will have ade-
quate information, doubt which is not seriously enough heeded
by the AC school theorists.' 94
Underlying this doubt are two principal problems: consum-
ers may not get adequate information about risk and they may
not understand the information adequately when they get it.
Either problem may lead to systematic consumer underestima-
190. See Session One Discussion, supra note 11, at 2232-33 (stating that in
all the product warranties Priest examined for an article on that subject, no
bargaining was going on between consumers and sellers with regard to per-
sonal injury).
191. P. HuBER, supra note 7, at 211-13.
192. See Abel, supra note 81, at 448-52.
193. See, e.g., Green, Wihen Toxic Worlds Collide: Regulatory and Common
Law Prescriptions for Risk Communication, 13 HARV. ENv. L. Rsv. 209, 219-20
(1989); Twerski & Cohen, Informed Decisionmaking and the Law of Torts:
The Myth of Justifable Causation, 1988 U. ILL. L. REV. 607, 613-15, 647.
194. The doubt is seriously heeded by Alan Schwartz. He posits that liabil-
ity for defective products should be handled by the market. He then carefully
identifies the nature of the imperfect information that might make resort to
the market inappropriate, and carefully examines both the theoretical and ex-




tion of risk. This, in turn, will lead consumers to get too little
compensation for the tort rights they gave up and will lead to
underproduction of safety.195
The evidence about these problems seems inconclusive.'1
Working from similar databases, the most extensive legal inves-
tigations of these issues reach somewhat different conclusions.
Howard Latin marshals substantial evidence from psychological
literature on perception and cognition, which indicates that
people do not accurately process the information provided them
about risk.197 Alan Schwartz asserts equally impressive evi-
dence for the more cautious conclusion that there is no good
proof that consumers misperceive risk, and that there is con-
flicting proof that they perceive risk accurately. 98
Nevertheless, there are indications of potential problems
serious enough to make us demand some assurances from the
AC school that their system of actual agreements will operate
with good consumer understanding of the rights they are giving
up. Most of the risks for which providers will seek to disclaim
liability will involve very small chances of injury for the con-
sumer. People have difficulty perceiving a very small chance of
injury as any chance at all. When the chance of injury is small,
the cost to the consumer of obtaining and absorbing the infor-
mation may exceed any likely benefit he will get from acquir-
ing such understanding. 99 When the risk is small, and the
desire for the product is substantial, the consumer most likely
will just ignore the risk, preferring not to focus on the bad that
can come along with a desirable commodity. This seems partic-
ularly likely with AC system agreements, which most probably
will offer consumers either the good or service with the maxi-
195. IML at 371-77.
196. The evidence seems inconclusive to me. I have read much more than I
now wish I had in an effort to find a satisfactory basis for a conclusion one way
or the other on these matters. For the reader wishing to jump into the litera-
ture, I recommend beginning with Schwartz, Proposals, supra note 16, at 371-
84, and Latin, Problem-Solving Behavior and Theories of Tort Liability, 73 CA-
LUF. L. REv. 677, 682-96 (1985).
197. Latin, supra note 196, at 682-96. Others share his view. See, e.g., G.
CALABRESI, THE CosTs OF AccmENTs 55-58 (1970); Fink, Book Review: Con-
sumer Safety Regulation: Putting a Price on Life and Limb (Book Review), 22
COLuM. & Soc. PROBLEMS 551, 572-73 (1989).
198. Schwartz, Proposals, supra note 16, at 378-83. On this issue, one book
well worth consulting is JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAITY: HEURISTICS AND BI-
ASES (D. Kahneman, P. Slovic & A. Tversky eds. 1982).
199. This is the prime reason Posner opposes contractual solutions to prod-
ucts liability situations. See Landes & Posner, A Positive Economic Analysis of
Products Liability, 14 J. LEGAL STUD. 535, 544-45 (1985).
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mum disclaimer permissible, or no good or service at all.2° °
There are other indications that people have difficulty un-
derstanding the meaning of risk. The widespread use of ciga-
rettes is a reminder that for many persons risks of harm some
distance in the future effectively disappear from present
view.20 1 The existence of social security underscores that idea.
The Social Security Administration exists because the govern-
ment concluded that people cannot sufficiently perceive even
the risk that they will get old and need money to support them-
selves. If people must be coerced to plan for the certainty of
old age, we should look skeptically on their competence to as-
certain the much less certain risks of accidental injury.
c. Impractical Implementation
Whatever its theoretical attractions, the AC system quickly
loses its attractiveness as one looks closely at how it will work.
As with Guido Calabresi's "Evil Deity' '20 2 and Mark Twain's
War Prayer,2 0 3 when American society signs on with the AC
school, it buys something more than just an increased pre-acci-
dent voice in its levels of accident compensation and expense.
It also buys a new expensive process for reaching this desired
outcome of supposedly greater choice. The process will add
large financial costs. Providers in a position to contract with
200. Priest reported that, in his studies of consumer warranties going back
well before 1960, he had never seen one that provided for any liability for per-
sonal injuries. After he made that statement directly challenging Epstein's
views of actual individualized contracts disclaiming liability, neither Epstein
nor Huber challenged this evidence. Epstein even acknowledged this uniform-
ity and proceeded to explain it as a rational market reaction. Session One Dis-
cussion, supra note 11, at 2232-34.
201. See G. CALABRESI, supra note 197, at 55-58.
202. G. CALABRESi, IDEALS, BELIEFS, ATrrUDES AND THE LAW. PRIVATE
LAW PERSPECTIVES ON A PUBLIC LAW PROBLEM (1985).
203. In Mark Twain's short story The War Prayer, the local preacher leads
the townspeople in an elaborate and sonorous prayer to God for victory on the
occasion of the young men's departure to fight in the war. While the preacher,
with his eyes closed and his breast swelling, invokes the aid of the Deity for
the war effort, an old man, a messenger from God, walks up the church aisle
and takes over the pulpit. The Messenger announces who he is, and expresses
God's willingness to answer the prayer, as long as the populace is fully aware
of just what it is they are asking for. The Messenger goes on to tell the
"down" side of the prayer the congregation had just heard: that the young
men of the enemy be destroyed, that their mothers and loved ones be crushed,
that famine sweep their lands and that untold misery be heaped upon them.
The Messenger reminds the Congregation that God is willing to grant their
prayer, as long as they are fully aware of what it is they ask. M. TWAIN, The
War Prayer in EuROPE AND ElSEWHERE 394-98 (1923).
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significant numbers of consumers certainly will spend a consid-
erable amount of money to ascertain which risks of injury, at
what costs, they are willing to continue to bear, and which they
wish to give up. Providers also face difficult decisions about
how much choice of tort claim waiver to give to consumers.
For example, should the consumer be given one price with pro-
ducer/provider tort liability as it now stands and another sup-
posedly lower price with that liability fully waived? Or should
some gradations of the extent of the waiver be built in? 2 o4
After these difficult decisions are made, substantial work
will be necessary to implement these decisions. Contracts will
have to be written, with several alternative clauses provided to
reflect different consumer "choices." Extensive training will be
necessary, on a constant basis, for all who will deal with the
public, so they can understand how to explain the choices avail-
able, and how to comprehend and record the choices consumers
make. Massive records will be needed, to reflect who has cho-
sen what protection. Once all those steps have been taken by
potential injurers, the potential victims will be asked to spend a
laughably excessive amount of time and effort in contracting.205
In short, the AC system either will end up giving less protec-
tion per dollar spent on products because of the system's mas-
204. Huber, apparently, would require building in some unspecified level of
gradation. Despite his supposed adherence to a philosophy of "consent, not co-
ercion," Huber would require that the actual liability-waiving contracts guar-
antee a minimum level of compensation to most injured persons. See P.
HUBEPR, suprm note 7, at 203.
205. Consumers would need to negotiate with respect to each good or ser-
vice consumed. Imagining what the checkout line at my local grocery "super
store" would look like in the AC School world is what leads me to term the
situation laughable. Were individual people in fact to be given choice, even so
minimal a choice as "with compensation for product/service caused injury" or
"without compensation," ordinary weekly shopping trips would expand enor-
mously in time. If the angry reactions of motorists who waited in gasoline
lines during the oil crises of the 1970s is any indication, one might expect that
lynch mobs would converge on the master-thinkers responsible for the
"choice" with which they were provided. Cf. Landes and Posner, supra note
199, at 544 (presenting one example: "It hardly pays, when buying a case of
beer, to enter into a contract specifying rights and duties in the event that one
of the bottles of beer explodes in your face."). Landes and Posner astutely
point out why the "laughable" situation described above would not develop:
consumers will not spend any significant amount of time making decisions
about whether or not to pay for tort protection against remote risks.
Even I pay no attention - none - to the chance that a mouse fetus might
be in my Coca-Cola As a torts teacher, I certainly have read enough about
such situations. I even know a man who claims he drank part of a Coke con-
taining a mouse. If I react thus, it seems unlikely that less-conscious consum-
ers will focus at all on the tiny dangers inherent in most products and services.
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sive transaction costs, or, as is more likely the case, the system
will gravitate back to the total disclaimers of liability that char-
acterized the pre-Henningsen world.206
In addition to the costs above described, consumers will
bear significant non-financial costs under the AC system. Con-
sumers will face repeated and significant decision-making costs
associated with thinking about a probable outcome.207 Like-
wise, they will face increased anxiety associated with uncer-
tainty about the choices they have made.208 They will face
these costs even if they opt for the same level of protection af-
forded them by present tort law.
This latter critique of the AC system should make clear
that this system will not work, at least not in the form
imagined by Huber and Epstein, in which individuals or even
groups of individuals could buy just the amount of "tort insur-
ance" they wanted. Not only have the theorists, certainly the
"pure" AC theorists, neglected the realities of imperfect infor-
mation,20 9 they also have neglected the realities of the agreeing
process.
3. The Flawed "what-they're-willing-to-pay" Analysis
The final area worth mention, which demonstrates neocon-
tract's lack of clear vision of reality, involves the wing of the IC
school that has analyzed tort damages. Their analysis suggests
tort damages should equal the amount and type of insurance an
injured person would purchase voluntarily.210 The types and
amounts of insurance people buy are used as a surrogate to
206. This is what is most likely to happen. See supra note 200, and accom-
panying text.
207. See Viscusi, Magat, and J. Huber, An investigation of the rationality
of consumer valuations of multiple health risks, 18 RAND J. EcON. 465, 468-69
(1987). These are not insignificant costs. The empirical data collected by Vis-
cusi and his co-authors indicate "striking evidence of the existence of a cer-
tainty premium," ici at 476, a willingness of consumers to pay more for a
complete removal of risk than for a corresponding decrease in the amount of
risk, ici at 468. The existence of the certainty premium is explained in part by
the reduced anxiety that accompanies certainty, and by the removal of deci-
sion-making costs. Id at 468-69. The certainty premium was substantial. See
a at 476-77.
208. I at 468-69.
209. Cooter and Sugarman, whose plan for a market in unmatured tort
claims fits into the "modified" AC approach, specifically limited the nature of
their proposed market because consumers would not have adequate informa-
tion to evaluate liability limits or waivers presented to them. Cooter &
Sugarman, supra note 41, at 181.
210. See supra text accompanying notes 54-57.
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help the theorists determine what compensation people really
want, given the costs thereof. As with several other neocon-
tractual perspectives, this "pre-insurance" view can be a valua-
ble analytical tool. It is misguided as the analytic tool for
determining the appropriate level of tort damages because it
blatantly ignores certain realities about people's lives. Using an
insurance measure for damages reflects an inadequate under-
standing of what people get from the tort system. Equally sig-
nificant, other equally valid measures of appropriate
compensation are available as surrogates for what people want.
Neocontractual analysis of the pre-insurance type reasons
in a way I understand, but find strange. The neocontractual an-
alyst looks at my life, particularly what I insure against di-
rectly, and deduces what I value and what compensation I
should receive when I lose that thing I value. It notices that I
pay for homeowners' insurance for my house, so that if it burns
down, it will be replaced, but that I do not buy any life insur-
ance on my seven-year-old daughter's life.2 1 ' From those lim-
ited facts, this school of neocontract concludes that I value my
house more than my daughter, and that if someone were to
negligently destroy my house, I should be paid the full amount
for which it is insured. Should my daughter be killed by some-
one's negligence, however, I should be paid nothing.' 2
In all fairness, this sort of neocontract does not say directly
that I value my house or my wages more than I value my
daughter. It is interested in determining what I am willing to
pay now to secure a monetary payment later. It asks that ques-
tion because it recognizes this is what tort law does. It charges
me a fee now, in the form of additional costs that are added to
goods and services by the provider's costs of liability insurance.
211. I do buy health insurance for my daughter, but simply insurance that
reimburses her medical care costs. Neocontractual analysis would not count it
as money I am paying to insure against my daughter's death. The reason I buy
health insurance is to guarantee that my daughter will be able to get whatever
health care she needs to prolong and facilitate the quality of her life. In short,
the real purpose of health insurance is the maintenance of the quality of my
daughter's life. I am not buying a certain dollar value of life, but I am paying
now to protect against a later loss.
212. Interestingly, this bizarre inference drawn by neocontractual analysis
is quite similar to the way the law actually treats these disparate situations.
From the standpoint of liability, the school bus company will be much happier
if its driver drives negligently and kills my child than if he drives negligently
and somehow destroys my house. In New York and most other jurisdictions, I
will not be able to recover damages for my emotional devastation because of
my daughter's death. See Bell, The Bell Tolls: Toward Full Tort Recovery for
Psychic Injury, 36 U. FLA. L. REV. 333, 338-40 (1984).
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In return for that fee, I am entitled to payment, in the form of
tort damages when something I value is harmed. Neocontract,
as I understand it, provides that if I am not willing to pay
money now in return for a guaranteed payoff in the event of
later harm, then I (and society as a whole) do not want to cre-
ate a system that costs money and provides compensation with-
out giving me a choice.
This is good analysis. It raises a serious challenge to the
longstanding tort practice of awarding damages for pain and
suffering, because, after all, people do not generally buy insur-
ance against pain and suffering.213 It says that if I am not will-
ing to pay now in return for an insurer's promise to pay me in
the event of my daughter's death, I should not be forced to do
that by the tort system.
This, however, is incomplete analysis. It looks on the tort
system only as an insurance system, because the tort system
looks like the insurance system in important ways. The tort
system charges people money, albeit in an indirect, unusual
way. It charges actors who will not ultimately receive the mon-
etary benefits of the system,21 4 and those actors charge higher
prices for their goods and services. In return, the tort system
pays out dollars on the occurrence of some injurious event. So
does health, disability and life insurance of the sort many of us
have. The IC school notices this and notices also that the first-
party insurance we buy pays out to us a higher percentage of
what we pay in than does the tort system. In addition, the tort
system pays out more money to us than do these health, disabil-
ity and life insurance policies we buy. Obviously, according to
these neocontractualists, the tort system forces us to buy a very
inefficient kind of insurance, namely more, and more expensive
insurance than we would buy if we had the choice.215
Neocontractual analysis provides a valuable insight here.
Law certainly should look skeptically on any set of rules pur-
porting to help people by making them buy things they would
not buy if given the choice. This kind of analysis reinforces
skepticism about the wisdom of court decisions that require
213. They do buy some insurance against pain and suffering, in the form of
insurance against accidental death or dismemberment and in the form of unin-
sured motorist coverage. See Schwartz, Proposals, supra note 16, at 364-65.
214. The "ultimate" benefits of the tort system are paid to the injured per-
sons who sue successfully in tort for compensation for their injuries.




persons to purchase certain medical procedures,2 1 6 or certain
safety devices in their products,217 deemed unnecessary by most
experts in the field.218
Neocontractual analysis of this sort asks the right kinds of
questions. It just does not ask enough of such questions, nor
does it ask questions when the answers are hard to come by.
Most often, critics argue that tort forces people to buy more in-
surance than they want, at a higher unit cost.21 9 Such criticism
notices only a part of what tort law does, its compensation func-
tion. The optimal level of compensation may indeed be that for
which people insure themselves in the existing state of af-
fairs.220 The tort system, however, does more than just com-
pensate injured persons. It deters, or at least purports to
deter,221 unreasonably unsafe behavior. It provides justice. It
gives injured persons a hearing, or revenge, or access to an-
swers to pressing questions. Accordingly, to properly analyze
the tort system, the IC school of neocontract cannot just com-
pare the insurance an individual would buy to the amount of
insurance the tort system requires him to buy in the form of
increased charges and increased payouts. Rather, it also must
ask how much money a person would be willing to pay to de-
crease her chances of being injured at all. It must ask how
much money a person would be willing to pay to increase her
216. See, ag., Helling v. Carey, 83 Wash. 2d 514, 518-19, 519 P.2d 981, 983
(1974)(holding physicians liable for failure to give patient inexpensive pressure
test for glaucoma, even though the patient was not in a group that manifested
any special risk of contracting the disease).
217. See Fords Faulty Capri Wipers Safer Than Recall Hazards, Charlotte
Observer, June 3, 1978, at 2A, col. 4, reprinted in W. KEETON, D. OwEN, J.
MONTGOMERY & M. GREEN, PRODUCTS LIABILIY AND SAFETY 847, 847-48 (2d
ed. 1989)
218. Cf. S. SUGARMAN, supra note 44, at 18-19 and accompanying notes.
219. See Danzon, Medical Malpractice, supra note 54; Leebron, supra note
54, at 273.
220. More likely, it is not. See infra note 225 and accompanying text (dis-
cussing willingness to pay as only one method for determining an appropriate
level of compensation).
221. Scholars have lengthy debates about whether and to what extent tort
law deters unsafe behavior. Sugarman has mounted an impressive case deni-
grating tort's deterrent effects. S. SUGARMAN, supra note 44, at 3-34. Most of
the influential law and economics writing about tort law, on the other hand, is
built on the idea that imposition of tort liability, or the threat of its imposition,
will influence actors' behavior. See, e.g., R. POSNER & W. LANDES, supra note
5, at 10-14. One aspect of the current public attack on the tort system comes in
the form of allegations that it too strongly influences behavior, deterring bene-




chances of attaining revenge against, or punishing, an actor who
wrongfully injured her. It must ask how much money a person
would be willing to pay to make it likely that she would be
treated justly if she were injured by another. It must ask how
much money a person would be willing to pay to ensure that
she would be heard in the event tragedy befell her and to make
it likely that she would be able to find answers to the questions
important to her life that arose from such tragedy. Then, neo-
contractual analysis should add up all those amounts people
would be willing to pay for what tort law does, along with the
amount people would pay for direct monetary compensation,
and compare that total to the charges tort law forces people to
pay.
After all, each of us does pay, in time, effort or direct ex-
penditures for such things. We certainly would pay more for
health insurance if the policy included a promise of less sick-
ness or injury. We buy products, such as food, vitamins and
safety helmets, because they reduce the chances we will be-
come sick or injured. We spend vast amounts of time watching
out for children, acquiring information or protesting the place-
ment of nuclear waste dumps or incinerators near us, all be-
cause they decrease the chances that we will suffer injury or
sickness. We willingly pay more for products or services if we
are treated well, be it good service at a department store or an
auto repair shop. Such good treatment would include listening
to our important stories and answering our important
questions.
Tort law does not necessarily do all these things, or do
them particularly well.2 2 Nevertheless, tort tries to do all
these things, and does some of them, to some extent, some of
the time. Therefore, when using neocontract's insights and es-
timating whether people are paying more for their tort rights
than they really want to pay, include those services the tort sys-
tem provides beyond mere compensation.
It is no surprise that neocontractual analysts overlook or
minimize these other services in putting tort law under the
"willingness-to-pay" microscope. Neocontractualists gener-
ally223 tend to be happiest when they can rely on the market to
222. For a more detailed discussion of what tort can and does deter, see in-
fra text accompanying notes 242-57. For mention of what tort can do to em-
power potential and actual accident victims, see supra text accompanying
notes 155-67.




determine the world's workings.224 For the most part, there is
no easily defined market in deterrence, justice, communication
and empathy. There is a market in insurance. So it is quite
natural that the "willingness-to-pay" prong of neocontractual
analysis focuses almost solely on the compensation or insurance
function of tort. This narrow focus reveals that neocontractual
analysis is limited by its intellectual roots in the market.
This school of neocontract analysis is further limited by its
overreliance on consumers' insurance behavior as the surrogate
measure of what level of compensation people really want, and
thus of what tort should pay them in damages if injured. In im-
agining what forms of compensation consumers might want,
some authors have suggested measures in addition to the
amount of insurance purchased. Rather than looking at what
insurance consumers have bought, they look at what consumers
would be willing to pay to avoid a particular loss or what price
consumers would accept to suffer that loss.M These modes of
ex ante analysis provide a more satisfactory method of deter-
224. See, e.g., Danzon, supra note 54, at 542; Epstein, Unintended Revolu-
tion, supra note 31, at 2193-2222.
225. See, eg., Cook & Graham, The Demand for Insurance and Protection:
The Case of Irreplaceable Commodities, 91 Q.J. ECON. 143, 146 (1977); Rea,
Contingent Damages, Negligence, and Absolute Liability: A Comment on Gra-
ham and Pierce, 13 J. LEG. STUD. 469, 469-70 (1984); Schwartz, Proposals,
supra note 16, at 362-66. Rea points out three concepts that might be used to
calculate the monetary equivalent of someone's nonpecuniary loss, in addition
to the amount of insurance that person would purchase: 1) the dollar amount
that would compensate him for the loss (compensation); 2) the dollar amount
he would give up to avoid the loss (ransom); and 3) the amount that is implicit
in his expenditures for risk reduction (risk value). Id. A slightly different
perspective would transpose the latter two concepts as: 2) the dollar amount
he would demand to willingly accept that loss; and 3) the amount implicit in
what dollars he demands for increased exposure to risk.
This latter perspective moves away from measurements of compensation
that depend on a person's wealth. That move is desirable if one worries that
the tort system may require poorer persons to spend more of their precious
dollars on compensation than is appropriate to their utility-of-money state.
See supra text accompanying notes 76-87. Although some of these perspectives
sound as if they should lead to the same results in terms of valuation of risk
and injury, forcing an individual to look at the possibility of injury from one of
these perspectives is likely to significantly change that person's values on the
risks. See, e.g., Viscusi, Magat, & J. Huber, supra note 207, at 477. In that arti-
cle, the authors report that consumers responded differently, in ways that
were "particularly striking," in the amount they were willing to pay for a re-
duction in risk of injury to them or their children in contrast to how much
money they would accept to have an equal increase in that risk. Their data
showed that the valuation of risk would be much lower, by a factor of six to
eight, if one looked at how much consumers are willing to pay for risk reduc-
tion rather than the same risk increase. Id.
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mining appropriate levels of compensation. They open up the
law to a fuller sense of what people value.
This fuller sense of what we value is an important part of
the law. For the law to tell the father of a child killed by an-
other's negligence that his compensation will not include any-
thing for the drastic loss of a relationship, but will include
money spent for medical care, denies the reality of the father's
experiences and values. It also socially devalues a child's life.
That the father did not buy insurance to pay him money in the
event of the child's death does not mean that the child was
worthless to him. It does not even mean that the father did not
spend money on insurance against the loss of the child. Money
spent on health care for the child, money spent on sure-grip
sneakers and a safer car, time spent watching the child, and
even repeated warnings to be careful - all those are expendi-
tures on insurance. The IC school confuses insurance with a
slot machine. Insurance is not purchased with the hopes of get-
ting a big payoff, but rather to guard against loss. Unfortu-
nately, the tort system has not yet developed a good method to
help victims with their losses, except with money. That present
failing does not justify treating victims as though the only com-
pensation they really wanted was the insurance dollars they
paid for. Tort compensation, unlike insurance payouts, repre-
sents society's valuation of the plaintiff's loss. The alternative
measures come closer to that true value.
C. LOST IN TRANSITION: A FLAwED PERCEPTION OF TORT
A third major category of flaws in neocontractual analysis
can best be described as its failure to describe and appreciate
the strengths of tort law. Neocontractualists wish to abandon
tort, either through institution of actual contracts or whittling
away damages through rules created by the imagined contracts
method. Their rationale is to promote autonomy and social
utility. However, they fail to acknowledge either the significant
autonomy supplied by the tort system or its significant social
utility function: the provision of safety.226 This section focuses
226. Tort's accident reduction function is by no means its only contribution
to social utility. Its contribution to individual empowerment and some of its
justice-supplying features have already been discussed. See supra text accom-
panying notes 142-67. Tort's compensation functions receive less attention.
Those functions are significant: tort awards provide injury victims much more
full compensation than any other source. See, e-g., Johnson & Heller, Compen-
sation for Death From Asbestos, 37 IND. & LABOR REL. REv. 529, 532-36
(1984)(arguing that only tort provided full compensation of net economic loss).
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on neocontract's false consciousness in those two regards.
1. Autonomy: Tort and Choice
Neocontract not only has refused to recognize the value of
choices provided individuals by the tort system, it excoriates
tort as a fundamentally coercive force.227 The IC school argues
that tort forces people to buy insurance they do not want.223 As
has been pointed out above, however, the IC school model is
based on extrapolations from consumer behavior in first-party
insurance markets. 229 Those models say nothing conclusively
about a person's willingness to pay for the deterrent and justice
effects accompanying tort decisions.
The free market forces of the AC school assert that tort
forces people to buy safety features they do not want, and that
it deprives persons of choices they do want.230 These charges
are correct, but may not be as serious as they seem at first
blush. They amount to saying that persons have been deprived
of bad choices.23' Despite the many examples trotted out by
Huber, most providers are reacting rationally to tort. They do
not withdraw their products or make them too safe. Neverthe-
less, tort does coerce some people in this fashion, particularly
careful persons or those who prefer risk.23 2
Tort also directs compensation more at actual victims, while neocontract, of
the AC school variety, provides benefits to all potential victims. If a just soci-
ety has a particular concern with the conditions of its least-advantaged citi-
zens, tort seems to be a step ahead of neocontract, because it does better for
actual victims. Given the serious underclaiming engaged in by accident vic-
tims, however, in theory it is plausible that even an AC system would provide
equally satisfactory compensation. An AC system ostensibly would provide
compensation to more persons, because it would benefit potential victims at
the time of transaction, a benefit that could assume the form of injury insur-
ance. In other words, tort probably would compensate more deeply than neo-
contract, but the latter might compensate more broadly. Thus, it is not clear
that neocontract should focus so attentively on tort's compensation function.
227. See, e.g., P. HUBER, supra note 7, at 191.
228. See, e.g., Danzon, supra note 54,. at 520-21.
229. See supra text accompanying notes 54-57.
230. See, e.g., P. HUBER, supra note 7, at 160-61.
231. Society has concluded that the good or service she wanted was "bad"
for her, in that liability rules will force the adoption of safety measures, or the
withdrawal of a good or service, only when it was unreasonable to provide the
good or service without the safety feature, or when it was unreasonable to con-
tinue to market the good or service without changes. Other psychological fac-
tors may inappropriately frighten providers into the unreasonable withdrawal
of a good or the adoption of a safety feature. Those factors are not endemic to
tort: they can be cured.
232. Risk preferrers and the particularly careful seem the segment of soci-
ety we need to worry about least, in terms of their likely financial well-being
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The coercion threatened by tort law pales beside the coer-
cion threatened by neocontract. Neocontract will present con-
sumers with take-it-or-leave-it "flypaper" contracts. 23 3 They
will be forced to do without the product they desire or the tort
protection they may and should desire. With respect to com-
pensation and other rules established by the inadequate imagin-
ings of the IC school, consumers will be forced to accept less
deterrence and compensation than some of them want, particu-
larly with respect to relationships at the core of their exist-
ence.234 Each consumer will be forced to bear a greater chance
of injury, regardless of whether she agreed to give up her tort
rights, because the waivers agreed to by her fellows will have
decreased the pressure on providers to behave safely.
Similarly, the choice provided by tort seems more appeal-
ing to consumers than the choice presented by neocontract.
Neocontract permits consumers to obtain some dangerous goods
they otherwise might not get.235 It allows them to obtain some
goods or services more cheaply.23 6 Overall, an observer might
be more impressed by the negative choices available through
neocontract. First, the consumer, by accepting the provider's
disclaimer of liability, places herself in a position in which she
is at the mercy of forces out of her control. The consumer no
longer has any power to threaten the provider with a sanction
if the provider acts unreasonably. This is just the sort of posi-
and ability to take care of themselves. In comparison, the persons most de-
prived of choice under neocontract are the victims themselves. See supra text
accompanying notes 152-55. Those are the people most likely to need societal
help. Coercing the former seems more desirable than coercing the latter.
233. Huber uses the term "flypaper" contracts to ridicule the notion of con-
tracts of adhesion. See, e.g., Huber, Rypiaper Contracts and the Genesis of
Modem Tort, 10 CARnozo L. REv. 2263, 2263-2285 (1989). For the explanation
why consumers in the Huberian system will face such contracts, see suprar
note 200 and accompanying text.
234. IC school damages will be awarded only for pecuniary loss. See, e.g.,
Danzon, supra note 54, at 524-26. Therefore, any disincentive previously im-
posed on providers by tort with respect to the risks of destroying relationships
they create will disappear. Children's lives will become much more affordable
in the eyes of potential injurers.
235. There probably will not be many such goods. See Attanasio, supra
note 19, at 735-37.
236. This likewise does not seem to be a large benefit. For most providers,
liability costs are a very modest component of their overall costs. See, eg., G.
EADs & P. REUTER, DESIGNING SAFER PRODUCTS: CORPORATE RESPONSES TO
PRODUCT LiABIurY LAW AND REGULATION 30 (1983)(reporting that premiums
for corporations' products liability insurance totalled only 0.115% of sales).




tion the imaginers in Kim Scheppele's more fully textured orig-
inal position would regard as an unacceptable constraint on
their choice.23 7 Second, the party obtaining the most significant
choice is the provider, who suddenly has been freed from worry
about negligence lawsuits.238
Look, in contrast, at the choice provided by tort, the ne-
ocontractual bogeyman of coercion. Tort gives the consumer an
informed choice whether she wants to encounter a dangerous
good or service. Tort forces providers to internalize many of
the injury costs associated with their products. That internal-
ization means that the product's dangerousness is reflected in
its price. Thus, the consumer receives substantial, meaningful,
easily digestible information about the relative riskiness of the
goods or services offered.2 9 Tort reduces the risk of accidents,
and thereby reduces the chances of crippling injuries, one of
the most severe constraints on an individual's choice.24° It gives
the consumer a choice of what to do about pressing a claim for
tort compensation after the accident, a time when she under-
stands the situation more fully. The consumer need not decide
ahead of time what she might want if she found herself in this
unknowable situation, as neocontract would require. She still
can abandon her tort claim after the accident, if she so desires.
If she wants to settle, she can. If she wants to press ahead with
a claim, for whatever such action will do for her then, when the
injury world is a very real one, she can.
Finally, tort offers the consumer another choice. The con-
sumer can take chances with dangerous goods and services.
Contrary to the doomsaying of some of the neocontractualists,
consumers can agree to accept risks. The doctrines of express
and implied assumption of risk stand available for consumers
who want to sit in unprotected seats at sporting events, race
Hangerous cars, test drive motorcycles or buy dangerous goods,
as long as basic conditions of free and informed choice are satis-
fied.m Autonomy exists in tort law.
237. See K. SCHEPPELE, supra note 10, at 75.
238. For a fuller description of the nature of the choices that will come to
the provider under the AC regime, see supra text accompanying note 151.
239. See, eg., Attanasio, supra note 19, at 738; Landes & Posner, supra note
199, at 549-50.
240. Attanasio, supra note 19, at 724.
241. See, e.g., Cash v. Street & Trail, Inc., 136 Ga. App. 462, 466, 221 S.E.2d
640, 642 (1975); Winterstein v. Wilcom, 16 Md. App. 130, 136, 293 A.2d 821, 824
(1972); W. KEETON, D. DOBBS, R. KEETON & D. OWEN, PROSSER AND KEETON
ON TORTS 482-86 (5th ed. 1984); Schwartz, Proposals, supra note 16, at 370.
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2. Social Utility: Tort and Safety
Although it is somewhat surprising that neocontractual
theorists attend so little to the autonomy-providing aspects of
tort, it is no surprise that they speak little about the important
contribution tort makes to social utility by creating incentives
for safety. A person unfamiliar with the area who read only
Huber's book would think there was nothing to deter. He
barely mentions providers' unreasonable behavior. Huber and
Epstein, and to a milder extent their neocontractual colleagues,
see the problem in tort as the excessive costs imposed by a co-
ercive, eccentric tort law. I see the problem differently;242 it is
primarily a problem of injury. A very low percentage of tort
victims file claims for compensation 243 Yet the neocontractual-
ists and business and professional groups identify tremendous
liability costs as a serious social problem. If such a small per-
centage of injured people can generate such vast costs, then the
extent of the problem of injury in this country is shocking. A
solution to the problem is to change risky behavior to safe be-
havior. In the face of this problem, and its obvious first-step so-
lution, the neocontractualists' advocacy of changes in the tort
system that would reduce incentives likewise is shocking.
Shocking, unless ... a theorist believes tort law does not
deter unsafe behavior. Peter Huber believes that tort deters.2"
Stephen Sugarman does not. 4 5 In his recently published book
recommending the demise of the tort system, Sugarman pro-
vides one of the most careful examinations in tort literature of
whether potential tort liability deters unsafe behavior.4 6
Sugarman's work marks an excellent start to what even he rec-
242. The excessive transaction costs of the tort system right now are a sub-
stantial problem. Those costs must be reduced. Abandoning the basic tort sys-
tem may be one way to reduce those costs, but it is certainly not the only way.
It can be done within the tort system. One place to begin is with changes in
the litigation behavior of the providers, who complain most loudly about the
tort system's costs. Their litigation behavior certainly contributes to the high
costs of litigation. In fact, costly litigation is in the injurers' interests: 1) small
claims will not even be brought against an injurer if lawyers for plaintiffs be-
lieve they need a large verdict to profitably bring a medical malpractice or
products liability case; 2) protracted, unpleasant litigation makes plaintiffs
want to give up or not claim at all; and 3) delay keeps the dollars sought by
victims in the injurers' pockets longer.
243. Abel, .supra note 81, at 448-52.
244. In fact, Huber seems almost certain that tort law far overdeters prov-
iders' behavior. See, e.g., P. HUBER, supra note 7, at 164, 170.
245. Nor do others. See, e.g., Siliciano, Corporate Behavior and the Social
Effwiency of Tort Law, 85 MICH. L. REV. 1820, 1884 (1987).
246. S. SUGARMAN, supra note 44, at 3-34.
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ognizes is a need to examine the issue thoroughly, particularly
with empirical work. This is not the place for me to jump into
the debate about tort deterrence. My small contribution to the
further examination has been done.2 7 Here, I want only to
contribute some observations that may suggest the unique role
tort can play in enhancing safety, a role completely ignored by
neocontractual analysis.
Before I point directly to aspects of that unique role, let me
tell about some reactions to the "real" world that occurred
while I was working on these issues. Relatives came to town
during the summer. We took them with us to Niagara Falls,
the first time I had visited since childhood. With us was my
then six-year-old daughter. Our first afternoon there, we
walked along Goat Island and at one point stopped at the top of
Bridal Veil Falls on an island that allowed us to look right
down at the water crashing on the rocks below. There below
us, amidst some land and rocks, was a cluster of wooden steps,
platforms, and bridges, populated by yellow-slickered tourists.
Now, you must realize that no one can go to Niagara Falls
and experience the power of the river and sense the noise and
fall of the Falls without thinking about death. As we looked at
the tourists below, struggling up the wooden stairs against the
wind and spray for an up-close encounter with the Falls, my
daughter asked me: "Daddy, is it safe down there?" I stared
down at the not-very-thick poles that stretched from the plat-
forms to brace against the rocks underneath. I had two near-
immediate reactions. The first was, "No, of course not! Just
look at how fragile those boards and supports are, and how
powerful are the water and wind banging against them." The
second was, "Of course it's safe. It has to be." I stayed with the
second reaction.
I have reflected on that reaction, then, and now, to under-
stand why I felt that apparently dangerous edifice was safe. I
did not think it safe because I was confident in the essential
goodness and consideration of the persons who constructed and
managed that facility. My life experience and the media pro-
vide me with plenty of evidence that there are people, many
people, who act inconsistently with the well-being of strangers.
I did not think the edifice was safe because I had faith in the
government agency, whatever it might be, that regulated its
construction or use. I had no confidence that a regulatory
agency would have either the will or the ability to check the
247. Bell, supra note 12, at 443-49.
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structure carefully enough to satisfy me.2 Neither did I re-
pose my faith in the market, serenely confident that an unsafe
operator would have been run out of business by a safer com-
petitor. In the face of consumer ignorance, just the opposite
might have happened.2 4 9
What made me think the structure safe was my knowledge
that the operators of the tour were aware that if they did not
make damn sure the thing was safe, they would get their pants
sued off. I recognize that even this is no guarantee. Neverthe-
less, I assumed the operators had sufficient characteristics of
stability that the threat of tort liability would operate on them
as it would on me if I had put my life into some business.
Tort liability: a constant reminder to be careful. The peo-
ple who built and now run the under-the-falls tour had to make
a vast rray of decisions in the creation and operation of this
tour. They had to decide whether it was worth it at all to build
the touring structure. They had to decide how to build it,
where, with what materials, with what supports, how long-lived
the material and its connectors should be, and what kind of
protective devices to incorporate into the structure. Since the
structure was built, the tour operators have had to decide how
often to inspect, the manner of inspection, what kind of people
need to do the inspection, what routine maintenance is neces-
sary, how often to replace parts susceptible to wear and tear,
what sorts of non-slip treatments to give the walking and
climbing surfaces, what kinds of equipment to give to the tour-
ists, what directions to give the tourists and what kind of super-
visory and/or rescue personnel to have on hand. From having
represented clients subject to federal and state regulations in a
large Washington, D.C. practice, from having represented poor
people subject to the regulations of the welfare and social se-
curity systems, and from having read a great deal about safety
over the last decade, I believe I have an informed sense of how
regulation works, in general. I have virtually no confidence
that regulators have any effective input into even a small per-
centage of those safety decisions.25
248. At Niagara Falls, I knew that this structure was subject to sufficiently
strong anti-safe forces that it bore close watching. I doubted that any regula-
tory body would provide the sort of regular inspection necessary to make the
structure "safe" for me - or even for me as a watcher.
249. See, e.g., Akerlof, The Market for "Lemons"- Quality Uncertainty and
the Market Mechanism, 84 Q.J. ECON. 488, 489-92 (1970).
250. Several theorists who favor turning away from the tort system pro-
pose that regulation will perform the safety function tort is supposed to per-
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Perhaps the tour creators and operators are very careful
people, who create and maintain the structure as I would want
to if I were conducting a business. 251 More likely, in my mind,
they are ordinary people, trying to make a comfortable living,
not eager to spend money to prevent accidents that probably
are not going to happen anyway and that, after all, have not
ever happened in their experience. Possibly they are venal peo-
ple, lured into entrepreneurial work by a drive for dollars that
makes them very reluctant to spend money "unnecessarily" on
safety unless a very strong case is made that such an expendi-
ture is critical.
Without stepping one foot into the theoretical world inhab-
ited by this and most other law review writings about tort, and
being relatively sophisticated about the tort system, I place my
trust in the safety of the under-the-Falls structure squarely
with the tort system. It threatens the venal person that the so-
desired wealth will turn to dust if some accident happens that
he should have been prevented. It nudges the normal person to
think more about safety. And it invites the careful person to
follow better (well, at least more considerate) instincts without
having to worry about a competitor gaining advantage.2 2 From
my perspective about to walk under the Falls, tort has the even
form, and do it considerably more efficiently. See, e.g., S. SUGARMAN, supra
note 44, at 153-65. There is certainly considerable debate about whether regu-
lation or tort more efficiently determines behavior. See, e.g., Latin, supra note
196, at 739; Komesar, supra note 134, at 33-35, 53-57. Full elaboration of this
debate must await another day.
251. I say "would want to" because I am not confident I would end up run-
ning a business as safely as I imagine I would, here in the academic world of
freedom and choice. In a small business, I would constantly face the choice of
spending money to avoid "small" risks or having that money available to me
and my family to satisfy immediate needs or strong desires. In a larger busi-
ness, I would feel pressure from shareholders or directors to deliver profits
and would see from those working for me "bottom line" accounting of how
their departments/divisions did in overall expenditures and receipts. More-
over, I might face competition from others not as concerned about safety as am
I, those able to underprice my business for what is apparently the same good.
In other words, a "good guy" will face considerable pressures not to spend on
safety in running a business. Cf Abel, supra note 92, at A31 (stating that if
only 12% of injured persons make tort claims, and there is perfect competition,
anyone who spends more than 12% of the optimum amount on safety will be
driven out of business).
252. Even the "better" person still must be concerned about making accu-
rate assessments whether a particular safety expenditure is worth it in terms
of the risks reduced, if she wishes to remain competitive. That is the sort of
decision-making, however, we hope is occurring. It is a different type of deci-
sion than deciding not to make an expenditure on safety because a competitor
is not making it and is not being penalized.
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more wonderful characteristic of omnipresence. Unlike regula-
tion or regulators, tort is there for every one of the vast
number of safety decisions the tour operators must make. It is
not some disinterested, overburdened or in-industry's-pocket
regulator who is looking over the operator's shoulder: it is me,
the tourist. If something happens to me or my family, I go
right after the operator under the tort system. And he knows
it.
This story illustrates some of the unique aspects of tort as a
deterrent or potential deterrent.253 It contains within it the
seeds of deterrence common to most tort stories: if one of the
Falls tours had a higher accident rate, and therefore, higher lia-
bility costs than the others, that tour would have to charge
higher prices than its competitors, thus driving tourists away
from the more dangerous service. A serious problem of injuries
would give private individuals an incentive to sue in tort and
thus to start the accusatory and investigatory ball rolling, in
much the same way private individuals operating in tort uncov-
ered the severe nationwide hazards associated with asbestos,
discoveries eventually acted on by government agencies.
The story also could have illustrated the role of tort as pro-
vider of an otherwise non-existent market for safety. If there
are many slip-and-fall injuries on that tour, then there is a mar-
ket for someone willing to work on non-slip stair treads for
waterlogged situations. That may not be so vital. The same
factors, however, undoubtedly were at work to encourage the
research that recently led to the discovery of a new vaccine for
whooping cough that does not have the side effects of the cur-
rent Pertussis vaccine,254 which has been the subject of several
much-maligned lawsuits.2- Without the pressure of such law-
suits and the knowledge that once this safer alternative was de-
veloped, vaccine manufacturers who did not use it would face
tort liability, it might never have been clear to the researchers
253. Sugarman emphasizes some of the factors that militate against tort
law having the deterrent effect economic models tend to ascribe it. Among
the factors he mentions are ignorance of law and facts. S. SUGARMAN, supra
note 44, at 7-8. Reform can remove such factors as obstacles to deterrence.
Hence, I use the term "potential" deterrence to remind us not to conceive of
the tort system as forever frozen the way it is now.
254. Vaccine for Whooping Cough Shows Promise, N.Y. Times, Oct. 31,
1989, at C13, col. 1.
255. See Huber, supra note 65, at 289 ("foolishness... driven by the myo-
pia of the judicial system").
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that development of this slightly safer vaccine would bring any
market demand.
Related to this, and of equally broad significance for the
question of tort's safety role, is a fine point raised in a thought-
ful recent article by Mary Lyndon.25 Lyndon emphasizes that
the lack of a market for information about the toxicity of many
products has limited the availability of such information.5 7
The only market is cost savings, primarily liability cost savings
of the sort that result from the pressure of the tort system to
do reasonable research.
One last glance at Niagara Falls brings to mind one final
unique aspect of tort. As is suggested by this story, originally
drafted a few days after I returned from that trip, I felt a cer-
tain strength in my relationship with a potential injurer, the
tour operator. Tort has the ability to empower individual peo-
ple, all over, wherever they encounter persons or institutions
whose heedlessness threatens them. The individual need not
rely on anyone else in that situation: the group of which she is
a member - the endangered-in-the-event-of-negligence con-
sumers - have to be attended to. Looking back at the experi-
ence and the story, I notice, too, that I felt some ownership of
the law. It was mine to use, to protect me and my loved ones.
Abstract neocontract is missing something substantial that tort
offers people.
CONCLUSION
What should the reader make of this Article? Neocontract
has some good insights. Neocontract has some bad insights.
Tort has some good sides. Tort has some bad sides. Not exactly
the stuff on which to build a skyscraping new legal edifice, is
it?
That is the main point of this Article. We have no business
now building any great new legal edifices, particularly not one
constructed entirely out of neocontract. Theorists of both the
actual contract and imagined contract schools believe that ne-
256. Lyndon, Information Economics and Chemical Toxicity: Designing
Laws to Produce and Use Data, 87 MIcH. L. REv. 1795 (1989).
257. Id& at 1813-15. This situation suggests how the AC schools' liability
waiver system might hinder development of injury-related information. Lack
of information about a certain chemical, say EDB, that is hazardous, means
people will buy it and willingly waive any tort rights related to injuries from
EDB for very little in return. Tort law at least would keep pressure on the




ocontractual analysis is the way to analyze and resolve tort is-
sues. They have been too insensitive to the serious and
potentially serious2 s flaws in neocontract in their rush to re-
place coercion with consent. Such analytical myopia ordinarily
would not pose a particular social problem. Tort law, however,
has stepped hard on some very big shoes in the last decade,
those worn by business and professional leaders. As a result, to
the extent neocontract displays hostility toward the tort process
and promises legal rules with the probable effect of reducing
that threat of liability, its schools are likely to gain political as-
cendancy in the legislatures and courts of the United States.259
What I encourage in place of this rush to a grand new theory is
continued tinkering with the existing tort system.260 Tort law
has displayed tremendous capacity for change and adjustment
over the years.261 Even with respect to the intractable problem
258. I use the term "potentially" serious to describe the flaws in neocon-
tract because I recognize that many people doubt that certain of these
problems exist. For instance, there is debate in legal academic circles about
the extent to which persons fully understand the consequences of contractual
waivers, and about the significance of that understanding. Compare, Priest, A
Theory of the Consumer Warranty, 90 YALE L.J. 1297, 1307-13 (1981) with
Latin, supra note 196, at 682-96. We need considerably more good research
into matters such as consumer understandings, deterrent effects, individuals'
experiences in the tort system, the real market price of injury and the like
before fair-minded people will stop debating the existence of problems such as
those raised in this Article. Even those readers who do not share my sense of
what I have described herein as flaws should at least recognize that these
flaws may exist and, accordingly, that broad neocontractual plans should be
scrutinized very closely before being subscribed to as a tort panacea.
259. See, e.g., American Tort Reform Association, The Reformer, Dec. 1989
("Dear Member" memorandum reporting successes of the tort reform move-
ment in 1989) (on file with author).
260. I use the term "tinkering" advisedly, recognizing that such a conclu-
sion would align me, at least in the eyes of Sugarman, with the "timid" Ameri-
can Bar Association. In his recent book, Sugarman disparages the ABA for its
incremental approach to tort reform in the face of academic criticism attacking
the major foundations of tort. S. SUGARMAN, supra note 44, at 88-89. He sug-
gests that the ABA's meek approach was an understandable expression of pro-
fessional solidarity with its members who make their living doing tort work.
Id. Sugarman notes unsympathetically that the ABA committee reporting on
the matter justified its refusal to take a comprehensive look at his favorite,
more sweeping, reforms because it could reach any consensus on substantial
dismantling of the tort system. Id. at 89. As do the neocontractualists gener-
ally, Sugarman seems to underestimate the value of group consensus forma-
tion as a method of arriving at decisions. That finds expression elsewhere in
neocontractualist disdain for jury decision-making. See, e.g., P. HuBEt, supra
note 7, at 11-12, 186-87. It is a typical product of the individualist mindset ne-
ocontractualists bring with them to legal analysis. See supra text accompany-
ing notes 26-64.
261. See, e.g., Bell, supra note 212, at 341-46 (discussing evolution of law of
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of massive transaction costs, particularly with respect to novel
or complicated situations, tort has been able to make some
headway by encouraging and permitting use of novel proce-
dures. 26 2 With the passing of the great insurance crisis of the
mid-1980s, there seems no pressing need for immediate massive
tort reform. Thus, the fifty states and other jurisdictions can
carry out their roles as experimental laboratories so new ap-
proaches, some of them no doubt inspired by neocontractualist
philosophies, can work their way through the courts or legisla-
tures into law. Other jurisdictions can in turn consider what
has been learned about the merits of this approach, and can in-
crementally implement or modify or reject it. Ideally, much of
this change would continue to come through judicial decisions,
which are unfailingly rooted in at least some real situation and
are regularly subject to reexamination and different-context
testing, both by other sets of litigants and other courts in other
jurisdictions.
When I think now of what it means to "tinker" with the
tort system, I first think of the work of a theorist, arguably one
of the neocontractualists' own, Professor Jeffrey O'Connell.263
In doing the extensive research that is buried underneath this
Article, I found myself growing more and more impressed with
O'Connell's work. Before working on this Article, probably be-
cause of my admiration for great theory, I had thought of
O'Connell's work as intelligent, modestly creative, and lucid,
but not on a par with that of the great tort theorists of the sev-
enties and eighties. In doing this work, I think I see more
clearly the virtue of his work. From the time of his pioneering
efforts in the no-fault automobile accident field,26 O'Connell
has been engaged in listening and watching the actual workings
of the tort system, offering suggestions for improvement, listen-
recovery for psychic injury); Calabresi & Klevorick, supra note 134, at 626
(discussing ability of tort rules to respond differently to different situations).
262. Some of the most innovative changes came about as tort reacted to the
massive asbestos case filings of the early 1980s. Those cases were identified as
particularly high in transaction costs. See, e.g., D. HENSLER, M. VAIANA, J.
KAKALIK & M. PETERSON, TRENDS IN TORT LITIGATION: THE STORY BEHIND
THE STATISTICS 26-28 (1987). Litigants developed numerous methods of cost
reduction, including the use of computer technology. See, e.g., D. HENSLER, W.
FELSTINER, M. SELVIN & P. EBENER, supra note 4, at xi-xxv; McGovern, To-
ward A Functional Approach for Managing Complex Litigation, 53 U. CHI. L.
REV. 440, 487 (1986).
263. See supra text accompanying notes 43-44.
264. See, e.g., R. KEETON & J. O'CONNELL, BASIC PROTECTION FOR THE
TRAFFIC VICTIM 273-98 (1965).
1248 [Vol. 74:1177
TORT AND NEOCONTRACT
ing to reactions, and offering new suggestions that reflect what
he hears. 0 5 O'Connell seems no less sensitive than other
scholars to the faults of tort: after all, he has been trying to
make major changes in it for a quarter century.26 He seems to
take it as his task to fix that system. To that end, he makes
proposal after proposal, helps draft and lobby for legislation,
develops programs to alleviate the disruptive effects of tort on
high school athletics, and then makes some new proposals.
None of the O'Connell articles I recall devote time to building
the philosophical grand designs characteristic of Schwartz,
Scheppele, Epstein or even Huber.6 7 I submit that the lesson
from the work of O'Connell is that we all will profit from giv-
ing up some of the philosophical high ground and coming down
to the realities of the world of tort. It is in the muck of real
people's lives and injuries, that the potential for fixing what
may be broken exists, along with the means to do it.
265. See, e.g., O'Connell, Neo No-Fault, supra note 40, at 904-07 (describing
how O'Connell modified a prior proposal in response to what he learned from
lawyers working in the tort area and in response to the realities of the legisla-
tive process).
266. See, e.g., O'Connell works cited supra notes 40, 44. For evidence of
O'Connell's continuation of these trends, see, e.g., O'Connell & Guinivan, An
Irrational Combination- The Relative Ex'pansion of Liability Insurance and
the Contraction of Loss Insurance, 49 Oino ST. L.J. 757, 764-65 (1988).
267. Huber seems to me more a philosophical critic than a grand designer.
Nevertheless, he criticizes from such a high philosophical mountain ("consent,
not coercion") that it seems appropriate to place him with these more obvi-
ously "grand design" scholars.
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